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The WTO Agreement on Agriculture1 (AoA) 
came into existence over ten years ago as one 
of the agreements annexed to the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The AoA declares in its 
preamble that the long-term objective of WTO 
members is “to establish a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system.” The 
current agricultural negotiations at the WTO 
are part of the endeavour to bring this objective 
one step closer to reality. The short-term 
mission of the AoA, on the other hand, was to 
launch the reform process and to take the first 
steps towards that long-term goal. The AoA 
disciplines on, inter alia, the three pillars of 
agricultural market access, domestic support 
and export subsidies constituted that first step 
on the path of reform. The in-built agenda 
contained in Article 20 of the AoA was 
designed to ensure that these AoA disciplines 
would be only the first step in a reform process 
that should culminate in the establishment of a 
fair and market-oriented agricultural trading 
system.  
 
This short study aims to provide condensed 
background information on the origins, nature, 
structure and scope of, and obligations 
contained in, the AoA focusing on the three 
pillars. To that end, the paper is structured in 
three parts: market access, domestic support, 
and export subsidies. Each of these three 
sections will in turn be structured as follows: 
Firstly, the key concepts in every section will 
be introduced. Secondly, the currently 
applicable legal regimes in these areas will be 
briefly described. Thirdly, the current sticking 
points in each section will be identified. And 
finally, the prospects in each area will be 
assessed on the basis mainly of the following 
official documents: the Harbinson modalities 
draft papers,2 later submissions by the major 
                                                 
1  Agreement on Agriculture (hereafter the AoA) in 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994. 
2  WTO, Negotiations on Agriculture: First Draft of 
Modalities for the Further Commitments, WTO 
doc. TN/AG/W/1, 17 February 2003 (hereafter first 
draft modalities), and WTO, Negotiations on 
Agriculture: First Draft of Modalities for the Further 
Commitments: Revision WTO doc. 
TN/AG/W/1/Rev.1, 18 March 2003 (hereafter 
revised first draft modalities). Reference is made 
to the modalities text in general in cases where 
players, the draft Ministerial Declaration issued 
on 24 August 2003 by General Council 
Chairman Carlos Perez del Castillo,3 the final 
draft that emerged on 13 September 2003 
during the Cancun negotiations4, the July 2004 
Framework Agreement5, and the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration.6 A brief conclusion 
summarizes the issues and provides some 
perspectives into the future of the agriculture 
negotiations. The issues of special and 
differential treatment and non-trade concerns7 
will be discussed as appropriate in each 
section. The final section provides a brief 
summary of the legislative implications of the 
AoA rules and commitments for WTO member 
countries. Before that, however, some 
reflections on the origins, nature and structure 
of the AoA would be in order. 
 
A. ORIGINS OF THE AOA  
 
The roots of the AoA are to be found in the text 
of GATT itself. The special status of 
agriculture, whether real or imagined, got its 
legal expression in the body of GATT rules 
which left some important loopholes in respect 
of agricultural trade from the very beginning. 
The loopholes had been there since the early 
negotiations for the ITO charter and the 1947 
version of the GATT, particularly in market 
access. It is notable that the size of the 
agricultural loophole in GATT continued to 
                                                                       
both original and revised versions provide for the 
same proposed rules. 
3  WTO, Preparations for the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference: Draft Cancun Ministerial 
Text – Revision, WTO doc. JOB(03)/150/Rev.1, 24 
August 2003 (hereafter referred to as the pre-
Cancun draft).  
4  WTO, Preparations for the Fifth Session of the 
Ministerial Conference: Draft Cancun Ministerial 
Text – Second Revision, WTO doc. 
JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, 13 September 2003 
(hereafter referred to as the Cancun draft).  
5  See WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision 
Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 
(WT/L/579, 2 August 2004), hereafter referred to 
as the “July 2004 package” or simply the “July 
package”. 
6  See WTO, Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, 
Hong Kong (13 - 18 December 2005), Doha Work 
Programme Ministerial Declaration 
(WT/MIN(05)/DEC), adopted on 18 December 
2005, 22 December 2005, hereafter the Hong 
Kong declaration. 
7  On the place of non-trade concerns in the current 
agriculture negotiations, see WTO Committee on 
Trade and Environment, Environmental Issues 
Raised in the Agriculture Negotiations: Statement 
by Mr. Frank Wolter, WT/CTE/GEN/8/Suppl.1, 5 
October 2005.  
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grow over time, particularly in the first two 
decades of its life, thereby further alienating 
agricultural trade from other sectors. This 
widening gap between agriculture and other 
sectors could be seen in the 1955 waiver 
granted to the United States from its 
obligations under the key GATT provisions of 
Articles II and XI;8 the exclusion of agricultural 
products from the new GATT prohibition of 
export subsidies in 19559; the creation of the 
European Common Agricultural Policy in the 
1960s10, which was later subjected to a series 
of renegotiations of commitments every time 
the Community expanded as envisaged under 
GATT Articles XXIV:6 and XXVIII11; the use of 
a “grandfather clause” by newly-joining 
countries in their protocols of accession to 
protect their agricultural sectors12; the use of 
                                                 
8  The Contracting Parties decided “pursuant to 
paragraph 5 (a) of Article XXV of the General 
Agreement … that subject to the conditions and 
procedures set out hereunder the obligations of 
the United States under the provisions of Articles II 
and XI of the General Agreement are waived to 
the extent necessary to prevent a conflict with 
such provisions of the General Agreement in the 
case of action required to be taken by the 
Government of the4 United States under Section 
22.” See “Waiver Granted To The United States in 
Connection with Import Restrictions Imposed 
under Section 22 of the United States Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933, as Amended” Decision of 
5 March 1955 BISD § 03S/32-41 June 1955. 
9  See GATT Article XVI:3 in particular.  
10  The reasons behind the creation of the CAP at the 
EEC level in the 1960s, which was based on the 
agriculture chapter of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, 
are both instructive in themselves and partly 
contributed to the direction taken by the 
multilateral trade rules on agricultural products. 
For more on this, see Gerrit Meester, “European 
Union, Common Agricultural Policy, and World 
Trade”, 14 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 
(Winter, 2005) p. 389 ff. According to Meester, the 
“low-level consolidation of the import tariffs on 
oilseeds, protein crops and products … cereals 
substitutes” was done at the GATT Dillon Round 
as a price paid for the introduction of the CAP at 
the time. See Id. 
11  For more on renegotiations and their legal 
consequences, see European Economic 
Community—Payments and Subsidies Paid to 
Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and 
Related Animal-Feed Proteins, report of the panel 
(L/6627 BISD 37S/86) adopted on 25 January 
1990. 
12  Paragraph 6 of the 1966 Protocol for the 
Accession of Switzerland provided, in relevant 
part, that “Switzerland reserves its position with 
regard to the application of the provisions of Article 
XI of the General Agreement to the extent 
necessary to permit it to apply import restrictions 
….” See Protocol for the Accession of Switzerland, 
BISD 14S/6-11 (July 1966). In the words of 
Christian Haberli, head of the International Affairs 
at the Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, upon 
grey-area measures, such as EC variable 
import levies, whose legality was always 
questionable but no clear-cut decision was 
ever taken; and a habitual disregard of such 
disciplines by other contracting parties more 
readily in agriculture than in other sectors.13 A 
steadily increasing number of agricultural 
cases were brought before the GATT dispute 
settlement system; but they could not address 
the real problem areas simply because the 
rules were not designed to bring discipline in 
agricultural trade, the more so in respect of 
some of the most important trading powers.14 
 
The frustration with this reverse development 
in GATT’s disciplining power over national 
agricultural trade policy finally resulted in 
growing calls, and later emerging consensus, 
particularly from the early 1980s, that GATT 
had to do something about agriculture. In the 
words of the 1982 GATT Ministerial 
Declaration, “there is widespread 
dissatisfaction with the application of GATT 
rules and the degree of liberalization in relation 
to agricultural trade” and “there is an urgent 
need to find lasting solutions to the problems of 
trade in agricultural products”.15 The only 
solution to the problem of agricultural trade 
could thus come only from the “political organ” 
                                                                       
its accession to the GATT, Switzerland obtained “a 
virtual carte blanche agricole” and was “free to 
regulate imports just about as it wanted to.” See 
Christian Haberli, “The July 2004 Agriculture 
Framework Agreement” in Bernard O’Connor (ed.) 
Agriculture in WTO Law (Cameron May, London, 
2005), p. 404. 
13  Writing about the pre-Uruguay Round situation of 
agriculture within the GATT, Trebilcock and 
Howse observed: “a number of the major 
exporting states had come close to ignoring GATT 
requirements altogether, even to the point of 
refusing to implement GATT panel decisions.” 
Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The 
Regulation of International Trade (Routledge, 
London and New York, 2nd ed. 1999), p. 247. 
14  Even the most creative panels could not create 
law; they could only interpret and apply existing 
law. There was simply a consensus that the GATT 
legal system “has not yet been able to engage 
agricultural trade policy in a significant way.” See 
Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: 
The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System 
(Butterworth Legal Publishers 1993), p. 327, 
finding that between 1960 and 1989 exactly one-
half of GATT cases involved agricultural products. 
Hudec found this on a working definition of 
agricultural products that was narrower than the 
definition given to agricultural products under 
Annex I of the AoA. See, e.g., Hudec’s exclusion 
of disputes involving cigarettes from agricultural 
disputes; cigarettes in fact fall under HS Chapter 
24, which are agricultural products for purposes of 
the AoA. 
15  See, e.g. the 1982 GATT Ministerial declaration at  
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of the GATT – and it took the form of the 1986 
Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration which 
launched the Uruguay Round. This Declaration 
put agriculture at the heart of the negotiations 
and declared: “there is an urgent need to bring 
more discipline and predictability to world 
agricultural trade by correcting and preventing 
restrictions and distortions including those 
related to structural surpluses so as to reduce 
the uncertainty, imbalances and instability in 
world agricultural markets.”16 The Uruguay 
Round negotiations aimed “to achieve greater 
liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring 
all measures affecting import access and 
export competition under strengthened and 
more operationally effective GATT rules and 
disciplines ….”17 Translating these political 
commitments into legally enforceable rights 
and obligations proved much tougher than 
anticipated in 1986. About eight years of 
testing negotiations finally came to a 
successful end with overall achievements that 
transcended the expectations of even the most 
optimist observers at the launch of round in 
1986. Agriculture played a key role in the 
success or failure of the whole negotiation 
process.  
 
B. NATURE AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE AOA  
 
A look at the structure of the AoA shows that 
this is an agreement that stands on three 
pillars – market access, domestic support, and 
export subsidies. This structure was not 
chosen arbitrarily by the negotiators; it was in a 
sense dictated by the very nature of the GATT 
loopholes that the AoA was designed to plug. 
As will be developed further later on, GATT 
had explicit agriculture-specific exceptions in 
the areas of subsidies and market access, 
which were essentially loop-holes on the body 
of the GATT text. As argued earlier, these 
loop-holes expanded rather than becoming 
smaller over the years and one of the most 
important objectives of the Uruguay Round 
was to find a lasting solution to the problems of 
agricultural trade. The AoA’s three pillars could 
thus be described as a three-pronged plug that 
went into the agriculture-specific loop-holes on 
the body of the GATT.18  
                                                 
16  See GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay 
Round (MIN.DEC) adopted in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, on 20 September 1986, BISD 33S/19-
28.  
17  See Id. 
18  We shall see later on however that GATT had only 
two agriculture-specific holes – market access and 
export subsidies – and the three prongs of the 
AoA were somehow designed to fill those two 
The AoA has always been a subject of 
controversy since its birth in 1995. Some look 
at it as an instrument with a potential to 
redress the imbalance in the trade relations 
between developing and developed countries. 
Others look at it as an instrument that 
“systematically favors agricultural producers in 
industrialized countries at the expense of 
farmers in developing countries” and thereby 
institutionalizes inequality.19 For some the AoA 
is an embodiment of “the recognition that 
agriculture has always been different and that 
difference needs to be recognised in 
something more than limited exceptions.”20 Still 
others accuse it of having too neo-liberal 
leanings, ignoring such facts as the lack of 
power for millions of people to purchase their 
daily food on the market; their dietary 
preferences, and even of ignoring the 
importance of agriculture in providing 
livelihoods for an estimated seventy percent of 
the world's population.21  
 
Related to the perception of AoA is the more 
academic question of why agriculture is so 
different as to make it effectively the only 
sector governed by a sector-specific 
agreement within the WTO. The explanations 
offered by different people range from what 
Ragosta calls the “farmers' unique role in 
maintaining an independent republic”22 to the 
U.S. Senate’s tendency “to represent land 
more than people”23 to agriculture’s role as the 
                                                                       
holes. We shall see that the third prong, domestic 
support, was found necessary in order to properly 
address the issues on the two other subjects. 
19  See Carmen G. Gonzalez, “Institutionalizing 
Inequality: the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
Food Security, and Developing Countries” 27 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law (2002), p. 
438. Gonzalez goes further and argues that the 
AoA “increases food insecurity by exacerbating 
rural poverty and inequality” in developing 
countries and hampers their ability to adopt 
appropriate measures to address the problem. Id. 
p. 476. 
20  See Bernard O’Connor, “Should there be an 
Agreement on Agriculture”, in Bernard O’Connor 
(ed.) supra n. 12, p. 418. 
21  See, e.g. Sophia Murphy, “Structural Distortions in 
World Agricultural Markets: Do WTO Rules 
Support Sustainable Agriculture?”, 27 Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law (2002), pp. 609-
610. Murphy further argues that the AoA ignores 
important ecological considerations and 
undermines genetic diversity. See Id, p. 610. 
22  See John A. Ragosta, “Trade and Agriculture, and 
Lumber: Why Agriculture and Lumber Matter” 14 
Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Winter, 
2005, 414-15. 
23  See Id. Dam also observed in 1970 that “no treaty 
that impinged upon the U.S. Farm program could 
receive the constitutionally required senatorial 
approval” K. Dam, The GATT; Law and the 
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source of our food, to its unique relevance to 
biodiversity and the environment at large, to 
the cultural issue of ensuring the survival of a 
rural way of life. A leading authority and 
practitioner on agricultural trade law, Bernard 
O’Connor, provides strategic and economic 
explanations and concludes that “agriculture is 
different from any other sector and is rightly 
treated according to the rules of a separate 
WTO Agreement.”24  
 
Amid all this diversity of opinion, almost 
everyone agrees that the AoA has taken the 
single most important step to bring agriculture 
more firmly within a system of multilaterally 
agreed rules, rules that led to the adoption by 
WTO member countries of new national 
legislation in order to bring their pre-Uruguay 
Round practices into line with AoA 
requirements.25 What is also clear is that, in as 
long as the AoA remains in place, agricultural 
products will remain a special category in 
themselves subject to special treatment within 
the WTO framework. An understanding of 
those areas of GATT that provided special 
rules for agriculture is essential for a proper 
appreciation of the meaning and effect of the 
AoA that came out of the Uruguay Round as 
well as the direction it is taking in the current 
negotiations.  
 





The share of agricultural exports in global trade 
has fallen from 47 per cent of total 
merchandise exports in 1970 to just 9.1 per 
cent in 2001.26 However, despite this decline in 
                                                                       
International Economic Organization (University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), p. 260. 
24  O’Connor, supra n. 12, at 419. 
25  An excellent example of national legislative 
changes that followed adoption of the AoA is the 
amendment of the Swiss Federal Constitution in 
1996, which had to go through a national 
referendum and the complete revision of the 1951 
Federal Law on Agriculture in 1998. For the details 
on this, see Haberli, supra n. 12, pp. 403-404. 
26  This is, of course, an average and masks very 
wide variations among countries. Extreme 
examples would be Japan with agricultural exports 
accounting for a mere 1.3 per cent of its 
merchandise exports and Ethiopia with 84.2 per 
cent of its merchandise exports accounted for by 
agricultural products. See WTO, International 
Trade Statistics 2002 (Geneva, 2003), pp. 105 - 
112.  
its share of world trade, agriculture remains the 
most sensitive subject for international trade 
negotiators and the multilateral trading system. 
Just like the Punta del Este conference in 1986 
which launched the Uruguay Round, 
agriculture was the deal-maker or -breaker 
during the Doha WTO Ministerial conference 
which launched the Doha Development 
Agenda.27 Just like in the more than seven 
years of Uruguay Round negotiations, 
agriculture is still the most contentious and 
also the most important issue in the ongoing 
Doha trade negotiations.28 Just as the many 
deadlines that came and went during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations were largely 
blamed on agriculture, so also are the many 
negotiating deadlines already missed so far in 
the Doha process29 and the collapse of the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference blamed largely 
on agriculture.30  
 
As noted earlier, although the Uruguay Round 
took the first most important step in the 
process of liberalizing agricultural trade, the 
developments thus far have been limited to a 
reshaping of the rules with little immediate 
actual liberalization. The treatment of 
agricultural products as a distinct category still 
forms part of the WTO architecture. The 
Agriculture Agreement provides for a system of 
rules significantly different from mainstream 
                                                 
27  It appears that agriculture was being rivalled in this 
only by the row surrounding drug patents for the 
pharmaceutical industry which received a boost 
from an unexpected source, the anthrax scare in 
North America and the resulting brawl between 
Bayer (the patent holder for Cipro – the anthrax 
treatment drug) on the one hand and Canada and 
the USA, on the other. A deal on pharmaceutical 
products was finally reached at the last minutes in 
the preparation for Cancun. See Decision of the 
Council for TRIPS, IP/C/W/405, 30 August 2003. 
28  As a World Bank study put it, “Reducing protection 
in agriculture alone would produce roughly two-
thirds of the gains from full global liberalization of 
all merchandise trade.” World Bank, Global 
Economic Prospects Realizing the Development 
Promise of the Doha Agenda: 2004, (Washington 
D.C. 2003), p. xvi.  
29  For example, the failure of WTO negotiators to 
meet the 31st March 2003 deadline for agreement 
on agricultural trade liberalization modalities was 
taken as a setback not just for the agriculture 
negotiations, but for the entire Doha process. 
Indeed, the subsequent failure to meet the 31st 
May 2003 deadlines for a modalities agreement on 
market access for non-agricultural products was 
blamed on that previous failure to meet the 
agricultural modalities deadline. See, e.g. 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-05-28/story1.htm  
30  The so-called Singapore issues – investment, 
competition, transparency in government 
procurement, and trade facilitation – were also 
partly responsible for the Cancun collapse. 
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GATT provisions for most other products, and 
its provisions have been made to prevail over 
inconsistent GATT/WTO rules. As such, 
agriculture is still a class in itself. Agriculture 
still stands alone as the sector where export 
subsidies are expressly and generously – 
albeit selectively – permitted under WTO law; 
where three-digit tariffs are rather common; 
where significant additional duties can be 
introduced in the name of ‘safeguard 
measures’ regardless of injury considerations 
and in the most unpredictable of ways; where a 
proven trade-distortive and injurious domestic 
support programme may escape any 
challenge; etc. In short, agricultural trade still 
has a long way to go on the road to 
liberalization. Seen from this perspective, 
therefore, although the Agreement certainly 
represents a significant breakthrough in the 
history of international trade regulation, it is 
also possible to say that the same Agreement 
is a standing symbol of continued failure to 
integrate agricultural trade into the mainstream 
system.  
 
1. Agriculture on the Road to 
 Hong Kong: Highlights 
 
One virtue of the Agriculture Agreement has 
been that it had an in-built agenda for a 
continuation of the liberalization process so as 
to realize its long-term objective of bringing 
fundamental change in the level of protective 
and distortive devices at work in many 
countries.31 At the same time, many members 
had long argued that agriculture should be 
brought within the fold of a broader round so 
as to allow trade-offs to take place – a strategy 
successfully applied more than a decade ago 
by developed countries to bring in intellectual 
property and services in exchange for a 
                                                 
31  See Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture 
which provides as follows:  
 "Continuation of the Reform Process: Recognizing 
that the long-term objective of substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection 
resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing 
process, Members agree that negotiations for 
continuing the process will be initiated one year 
before the end of the implementation period, 
taking into account:  (a) the experience to that 
date from implementing the reduction 
commitments;  (b) the effects of the reduction 
commitments on world trade in agriculture; (c) 
non-trade concerns, special and differential 
treatment to developing country Members, and the 
objective to establish a fair and market-oriented 
agricultural trading system, and the other 
objectives and concerns mentioned in the 
preamble to this Agreement; and (d) what further 
commitments are necessary to achieve the above 
mentioned long-term objectives." 
promise to re-integrate agriculture and textiles 
into the system. Launching the already 
mandated negotiations in agriculture as part of 
a broader negotiation round was also one of 
the primary objectives of the third WTO 
Ministerial Conference at Seattle.32  
 
Seattle proved to be a disappointing failure, 
and the widely-expected Millennium Round of 
trade negotiations was not launched. But, 
since agriculture was one of a few areas on 
which a negotiation had already been 
mandated by the results of the Uruguay 
Round, the WTO General Council was able to 
launch a sector-specific negotiation process on 
7 February 2000.33 In accordance with a 
programme agreed on that occasion, the WTO 
agriculture negotiators held their first meeting 
on 23–24 March 2000. In the first phase of the 
process (which covered the period between 
March 2000 and March 2001), several 
meetings were held and dozens of proposals 
submitted by about 89 percent of the WTO’s 
membership. These submissions were further 
developed with more technical details during 
the largely informal meetings of the second 
phase of the negotiations (from March 2001 to 
March 2002). An important development during 
this second phase of the sectoral negotiations 
in agriculture came from the Doha ministerial 
conference (November 2001) which launched 
a comprehensive trade negotiation round and 
brought the already proceeding agricultural 
negotiations within its fold. Indeed, the pre-
Doha phase of the agriculture negotiations was 
sending the clear message that progress in 
agriculture would be possible only if a broader 
round was launched at Doha.  
 
On agriculture, the Doha Declaration provided 
as follows:  
 
“... We recall the long-term objective 
referred to in the Agreement to establish a 
fair and market-oriented trading system 
through a programme of fundamental 
reform encompassing strengthened rules 
and specific commitments on support and 
protection in order to correct and prevent 
restrictions and distortions in world 
agricultural markets.  We reconfirm our 
commitment to this programme.  Building 
                                                 
32  Held at Seattle, United States, from 30 November 




33  See WTO, Services and Agriculture negotiations: 
meetings set for February and March, WTO Press 
Release (Press/167) 7 February 2000. 
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on the work carried out to date and without 
prejudging the outcome of the negotiations 
we commit ourselves to comprehensive 
negotiations aimed at:  substantial 
improvements in market access;  
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all 
forms of export subsidies;  and substantial 
reductions in trade-distorting domestic 
support.  We agree that special and 
differential treatment for developing 
countries shall be an integral part of all 
elements of the negotiations and shall be 
embodied in the Schedules of concessions 
and commitments and as appropriate in the 
rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as 
to be operationally effective and to enable 
developing countries to effectively take 
account of their development needs, 
including food security and rural 
development.  We take note of the non-
trade concerns reflected in the negotiating 
proposals submitted by Members and 
confirm that non-trade concerns will be 
taken into account in the negotiations as 
provided for in the Agreement on 
Agriculture.”34 
 
Five broad negotiation issues have been 
identified in this paragraph: market access, 
export subsidies, domestic support, special 
and differential treatment, and non-trade 
concerns. While this is clear from the text, 
countries have subsequently argued over the 
degree of importance that should be attached 
to each of these issues – some wanted to give 
equal weight to all five of them while others 
contended that there was a hierarchy built into 
them.35 But, of course, the order and tone of 
presentation of these five items clearly shows 
a hierarchy which puts the three pillars of the 
AoA (market access, export subsidies, and 
domestic support) on top, followed in second 
                                                 
34  WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted on 14 November 
2001, para. 13. 
35  A useful summary of the negotiation process 
prepared by the Information and Media Relations 
Division of the WTO noted the following on 21 
October 2002: “Some countries have described 
the mandate given by Article 20 as a ‘tripod’ 
whose three legs are export subsidies, domestic 
support, and market access. Non-trade concerns 
and special and differential treatment for 
developing countries would be taken into account 
as appropriate. Others say it is a ‘pentangle’ 
whose five sides also include non-trade concerns 
and special and differential treatment for 
developing countries as separate issues in their 
own right.” WTO Secretariat, Agriculture 
Negotiations: Where We are Now 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_
bkgrnd00_contents_e.htm, p. 12.  
place by special and differential treatment 
(note the use of such strong terms as “shall be 
an integral part of all elements of the 
negotiations”) and lastly, the so-called non-
trade concerns (indicated by the weaker 
wording of the commitment to “take note of the 
non-trade concerns”). Among the three pillars, 
too, there is a difference in the immediate 
negotiation objectives. The commitments in the 
areas of market access and domestic support 
are similar in that they talk about introducing 
“substantial improvements in market access”, 
and “substantial reductions in trade-distorting 
domestic support”. On the other hand, the 
commitments on export subsidies sound 
stronger: “reductions of, with a view to phasing 
out, all forms of export subsidies.” This was 
one of the most contentious subjects during 
the Doha ministerial talks; indeed, success and 
failure in the talks were hanging on the wording 
of the clause “with a view to phasing out” 
export subsidies in this paragraph.36  
 
The third phase in the agriculture negotiations, 
known as the modalities phase, began in 
March 2002. The hope was to conclude this 
phase on the 31st of March 2003 with the 
adoption of a modalities agreement.37 As per 
the Doha negotiation schedule, the fifth 
session of the WTO Ministerial Conference 
(held at Cancun, Mexico, from 10 to 14 
September 2003) was to be the time for 
Members to submit comprehensive draft tables 
of concessions in agriculture based on these 
modalities. However, as so often in trade 
negotiations, reality once again fell short of 
ambition; progress was lacking in many areas. 
Agriculture Committee Chairman Stuart 
Harbinson nonetheless managed to put 
together a first modalities draft paper which he 
circulated on 17 February 2003.38 The reaction 
was typical of agriculture negotiations – some 
condemning it for going too far, others for not 
going far enough. A month later, on 18 March 
2003, Harbinson circulated a revised version of 
his draft,39 but only to elicit the same reactions. 
                                                 
36  A Financial Times report on 14 November 2001 – 
i.e. the date scheduled for the conclusion of the 
Doha ministerial talks – noted that France 
objected to “wording in the draft WTO agenda that 
calls for negotiations ‘with a view to phasing out’ 
all farm export subsidies.” P. 14. The following 
day, the Financial Times reported that an all-night 
haggling in Doha ended in agreement and pointed 
out: “France was bought off with an assurance that 
the ministers’ declaration did not ‘pre-judge’ the 
outcome of future farm trade talks.” P. 15. 
37  Paragraph 14 of the Doha Declaration provided: 
“Modalities for the further commitments … shall be 
established no later than 31 March 2003.” 
38  See first modalities draft, supra n. 2. 
39  See revised first modalities draft, supra n. 2. 
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Indeed, as Harbinson himself noted, several 
participants did not even “accept the revised 
First Draft as a basis for the negotiations”.40 
Over time, a tacit agreement was reached to 
pursue the goal in two stages: first agree on 
some kind of a ‘framework modalities 
agreement’ and then proceed to the full 
modalities. On that basis, and in an effort to 
break the deadlock, the US and the EU got 
together and came up with what was called the 
‘US-EU joint proposal’.41 The immediate impact 
of this bilateral submission on the negotiations 
was such that, in the words of WTO 
spokesperson Keith Rockwell, it “galvanised 
the process in a way that we have not seen in 
three-and-a-half years of agriculture 
negotiations”.42 However, later developments 
suggested that the joint proposal might have 
backfired in the sense that “instead of 
encouraging consensus, the proposals 
prompted Brazil, India, China and about 20 
other developing countries to group together to 
demand radical cuts in wealthy nations’ farm 
subsidies and trade barriers.”43 This demand 
from the so-called G20 countries came in the 
form of a “proposal for a framework 
document.”44 The effect of these and other 
developments was that the Cancun ministerial 
could only talk about a framework for 
modalities, further delaying the already 
overdue agreement on modalities. In the 
preparation for Cancun, WTO General Council 
Chairman Carlos Pérez del Castillo prepared a 
framework proposal for agricultural modalities 
hoping to translate the resulting document into 
detailed and full modalities in the post-Cancun 
phase. What is worse, Ministers failed to reach 
an agreement even on such a framework 
document – a failure which, together with the 
deadlock over the so-called Singapore issues, 
led to the collapse of the whole Cancun 
                                                 
40  See Negotiations on Agriculture: Report by the 
Chairman…to the TNC TN/AG/10, 7 July 2003, 
para. 8. 
41  See EU-US Joint Text on Agriculture (Aug. 13, 
2003), available at, 
http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/atsd/Resources/docs/
EC-US_joint_text_13_Aug_2003.pdf.  
42  See ICTSD, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-08-
21/story2.htm; see also “U.S., EU Agriculture 
Framework Sees Partial Elimination of Export 
Subsidies”, Inside US Trade, 13 August 2003. 
43  See Guy de Jonquiers, Comment and Analysis, 
Financial Times, 16 September 2003, p. 21. 
44  See WTO, Agriculture - Framework Proposal, 
Joint Proposal by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand and Venezuela, WT/Min(03)/W/6, 4 
September 2003 (hereafter the pre-Cancun G20 
proposal).  
Ministerial session. With the Cancun failure, 
the agriculture agenda and the future of the 
WTO itself came under question.  
The feeling of disappointment that followed the 
Cancun setback was later tempered by the 
July 2004 Package and the Framework 
Agreement reached for the establishment of 
the agricultural Modalities.45 Although the July 
package was full of broad and vague 
declarations without any specific commitments, 
it nonetheless managed to give a sense of 
direction to the entire exercise. Among the 
main achievements of the July package are its 
adoption of a single but tiered formula for the 
reduction of agricultural tariffs (the higher the 
tariff levels the steeper the cuts); its use of a 
similarly tiered formula to reduce trade-
distorting domestic support (the higher a 
member’s support levels, the higher the cuts) 
both at the specific level of amber box 
measures subject to AMS commitments and 
the overall level of trade distortive domestic 
support measures in general (i.e. Amber Box, 
de minimis, and Blue Box combined) with a 20 
per cent down payment at the beginning of the 
implementation period; and the agreement to 
eliminate export subsidies as listed in 
members’ schedules as well as other forms of 
export support, such as export credits, export 
credit guarantees or insurance programmes, 
exporting state trading enterprises and food aid 
practices that market access have the same 
effect as the listed export subsidies. However, 
the developments between July 2004 and 
December 2005 had been so disappointing 
that the WTO had to lower its expectations 
from the sixth WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong 
(13-17 December 2005), lest the Cancun 
experience would be repeated.46 The Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration has added some 
specifics to the otherwise broad commitments 
of the July package, such as the decision to 
have three bands for reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support, to complete the 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 
2013, and to adopt four bands for structuring 
tariff cuts. Members also committed to 
complete the agriculture modalities by 30 April 
2006 and to submit comprehensive schedules 
based thereon by 31 July 2006, which would 
then lead to the conclusion of the Doha Round 
by end of 2006. Whether such an ambitious 
agenda will be met is yet to be seen. Most 
                                                 
45  See July package, supra n. 5.  
46  See Frances Williams, “WTO chief meets 
ministers in bid to salvage talks”, Financial Times, 
Nov. 9, 2005, P. 10, quoting EU trade 
commissioner Peter Mandelson as saying: “There 
is a clear preference by the great majority to adjust 
expectations for Hong Kong.” 
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observers are naturally pessimistic about it. 
Compared to Cancun, Hong Kong was of 
course a success. However, it was also taken 
by many as a missed opportunity and a 
disappointment.47 Indeed, EU trade 
commissioner Peter Mandelson himself was 
quoted to have said: “If we didn't make the 
conference a success, we certainly saved it 





By agricultural market access, we mean the 
terms and conditions under which agricultural 
products could be imported into WTO member 
countries. Countries often set up different 
forms of barriers against the importation of 
goods and services for several reasons.49 
These barriers are generally of two types: 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). From its 
very beginning, GATT has had a preference for 
tariffs over NTBs, and Article XI prohibits NTBs 
with only a few general50 and one agriculture-
specific exceptions.51 The agriculture-specific 
                                                 
47  See, inter alia, “Hard truths: The Doha trade round 
is still alive, but hardly healthy”, The Economist 
(Dec. 20th 2005).  
48  See Keith Bradsher, “Trade Officials Agree to End 
Subsidies for Agricultural Exports”, New York 
Times, Dec. 2005. 
49  These include protection of competing domestic 
producers, generation of governmental revenue, 
enforcement of internal health, technical, and 
other regulations, etc. 
50  The general exceptions include the balance-of-
payments restrictions allowed under Article XII, the 
development provisions of Article XVIII, and those 
covered under Article XX.  
51  Article XI:2(c) provides for the only agriculture-
specific exception in the GATT as follows: the 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions under 
paragraph 1 does not extend to:  
“import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries 
product, imported in any form, necessary to the 
enforcement of governmental measures which 
operate: (i) to restrict the quantities of the like 
domestic product permitted to be marketed or 
produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic 
production of the like product, of a domestic 
product for which the imported product can be 
directly substituted; or (ii) to remove a temporary 
surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is 
no substantial domestic production of the like 
product, of a domestic product for which the 
imported product can be directly substituted, by 
making the surplus available to certain groups of 
domestic consumers free of charge or at prices 
below the current market level; or (iii) to restrict the 
quantities permitted to be produced of any animal 
product the production of which is directly 
dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported 
commodity, if the domestic production of that 
commodity is relatively negligible. Any contracting 
exception contained in Article XI:2(c) is a 
tightly-defined exception with a history of 
narrow interpretations by GATT panels. 
Although it was invoked by defendants in 
several GATT cases to justify their agricultural 
import restrictions, not a single country was 
successful throughout the history of GATT.52  
 
However, the tight conditions attached to this 
exception as well as the strict construction it 
enjoyed in the hands of GATT panels did not 
deter countries from resorting to quantitative 
restrictions. Indeed the major obstacles to 
international agricultural trade were non-tariff 
barriers of the sort prohibited under Article XI 
and not justified by either the agriculture-
specific or general exceptions of GATT.53 An 
important challenge in the area of agricultural 
trade was to bring some discipline into this 
widespread use of non-tariff barriers, often in 
violation of the rules. Given that they were 
often maintained in violation of GATT rules, the 
logical outcome should be their elimination. 
This was however practically unachievable. 
The most that the Uruguay Round could do 
was convert all pre-existing ‘non-tariff’ barriers 
                                                                       
party applying restrictions on the importation of 
any product pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) of this 
paragraph shall give public notice of the total 
quantity or value of the product permitted to be 
imported during a specified future period and of 
any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, 
any restrictions applied under (i) above shall not 
be such as will reduce the total of imports relative 
to the total of domestic production, as compared 
with the proportion which might reasonably be 
expected to rule between the two in the absence 
of restrictions. In determining this proportion, the 
contracting party shall pay due regard to the 
proportion prevailing during a previous 
representative period and to any special factors 
which may have affected or may be affecting the 
trade in the product concerned.” 
52  For more on this, see Melaku Geboye Desta, The 
Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: 
from GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture (Kluwer, 2002), Part I. 
53  An important question here is as to why GATT 
contracting parties allowed this to happen and did 
not challenge more of these measures under 
Article XI. The explanations suggested by Bernard 
O’Connor include: the fact that many countries 
with comparative advantage in agricultural 
production were not GATT contracting parties; that 
many countries had their own programmes in 
place and did not want to promote jurisprudence 
that could come back to haunt them; and that 
Governments did not take international action 
because they agreed in the need to manage 
domestic production and supply. Bernard 
O’Connor, “Book Review: The Law of International 
Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 
to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture”, Journal of 
International Economic Law (Volume 6, Issue 2, 
July 2003), pp. 537-538. 
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(NTBs) into their tariff equivalents via the 
innovative approach of tariffication regardless 
of whether those measures were maintained 
consistently with GATT rules. This tariffication 
exercise applied to a range of measures 
including not just the traditional NTBs, such as 
quotas and quantitative restrictions, but also 
such other measures as “variable import levies 
[often associated with EC agricultural 
protectionism], minimum import prices, 
discretionary import licensing, non-tariff 
measures maintained through state-trading 
enterprises, voluntary export restraints, and 
similar border measures other than ordinary 
customs duties”.54 According to the Appellate 
Body, these different forms of border measures 
have one thing in common: “they restrict the 
volume or distort the price of imports of 
agricultural products.”55 The resulting tariffs 
were also bound against any future increase 
and then subjected to a 36% minimum 
reduction commitment on the average tariff 
levels (and a 15% minimum per tariff line) over 
a six year implementation period (for 
developing countries, the reduction rate is two-
thirds of the above percentages over a ten-
year implementation period). At the same time, 
because the actual conversion of non-tariff 
barriers into their tariff equivalents was left to 
the member countries themselves, the 
resulting tariffs were often much higher than 
their genuine equivalents (due to what was 
called the problem of “dirty tariffication”).  
 
This whole process gave rise to two 
contradictory but more or less well-founded 
concerns: some feared that the final outcome 
of the tariffication exercise could be more 
restrictive – or at least no less restrictive – than 
the pre-tariffication period; some others feared 
that tariffication would lead to excessive and/or 
low-priced imports thereby injuring their 
domestic producers. Several supplementary 
arrangements were made to accommodate 
these concerns.  
 
                                                 
54  See footnote 1 to Article 4:2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. 
55  See Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural 
Products, report of the Appellate Body, 
(WT/DS207/AB/R, issued on 23 September 2002), 
para. 200. One may of course question whether 
ordinary customs duties as well are not doing 
exactly that: restrict the volume or distort the price 
of imports of agricultural products. But, as the 
Appellate Body itself emphasised throughout the 
report, transparency and predictability are the 
reasons behind the preference for ordinary 
customs duties. 
To protect against the unintended but likely 
result of a more restrictive regime after 
tariffication, countries undertook what are 
called “current access commitments” that 
attempted to guarantee that historic levels of 
imports would remain not adversely affected by 
the tariffication process. This commitment 
applied in situations where imports of a product 
during the base period (1986-88) already 
represented at least five per cent of 
corresponding domestic consumption, which 
was far from common in agriculture. In cases 
where imports during the base period were less 
than five percent, members undertook a 
commitment to create what are called “minimum 
access opportunities” representing three 
percent of domestic consumption of the 
product for the base period for the first year of 
the implementation period (1995), reaching five 
per cent by the end of the implementation 
period (2000). In theory, therefore, a minimum 
of five per cent of the domestic consumption of 
every product in every member country today 
must be accounted for by imports; or at least 
the business opportunities to do so must be in 
place. To give effect to the minimum/current 
access commitments, countries were obliged 
to establish tariff quotas at “low or minimal” duty 
rates. Administering these tariff quotas has 
proved to be much more difficult than 
anticipated during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  
 
On the other hand, to accommodate fears of 
excessive or low-priced imports into the newly-
opened markets, a special arrangement was 
made to allow the introduction of special 
safeguard (SSG) measures on tariffied 
products under less stringent conditions than 
those set by GATT Article XIX and the 
Safeguards Agreement (the most important 
being the absence of an injury requirement 
under Article 5 of the AoA). The fate of these 
arrangements and their practical 
administration, together with the traditional 
question of how to further reduce the existing 
agricultural tariffs, constitute the core of the 
market access aspect of the ongoing 
negotiations.56 These will be discussed in turn.  
 
 
                                                 
56  There are also a few new market access issues, 
such as protection of geographical indications, that 
are currently being pushed by some members.  
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A. TARIFF REDUCTIONS IN THE 
CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS 
 
1. Negotiations on Tariff Reductions 
on the Road to Cancun 
 
Now that tariffs are the only means of 
protection at the border57, the most important 
market access issue in the current negotiations 
relates to the depth of tariff reductions and the 
method by which to achieve desired reduction 
targets. While several options have been 
proposed so far, those from the US and the 
Cairns Group on the one hand and from the 
EU on the other appear to represent the two 
extreme positions and most others fell 
somewhere in between. At the most 
conservative end, the EC proposed to stick to 
the Uruguay Round tradition both in terms of 
style as well as numerical targets, and 
suggested a formula for “an overall average 
reduction of 36 % and a minimum reduction 
per tariff line of 15% as was the case in the 
Uruguay Round.”58 At the most liberal end 
stood the US proposal – also supported by the 
cairns Group – which ambitiously called for the 
adoption of what it called the “Swiss 25” 
formula59 of tariff harmonization (higher cuts on 
higher tariffs) so as to reduce all higher tariffs 
to a maximum of 25 percent (keeping in-quota 
tariffs still lower) to be implemented in equal 
                                                 
57  Note that there are a few temporary exceptions, 
maintained under special treatment provisions, 
currently in use by Chinese Taipei, Korea and the 
Philippines on rice. See WTO Secretariat, WTO 
Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and Where 
We are Now 10 October 2002, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_
bkgrnd00_contents_e.htm The OECD has also 
noted that Hungary and Poland tariffied only 91% 
and 96% respectively of their agricultural NTBs. 
See OECD, The Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture: an Evaluation of Its Implementation in 
OECD Countries (Paris, 2001) p. 23. 
58  The EC'S Proposal for Modalities in the WTO 
Agriculture Negotiations (29 January 2003), 
available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/external/wto/
officdoc/mod.pdf.   
59  The “Swiss formula” is a term used to describe a 
tariff harmonization formula originally suggested 
by Switzerland during the Tokyo round of 
negotiations for tariff reductions in manufactured 
products; it is not supported by the Swiss in the 
current agricultural negotiations. Because the US 
proposed to reduce all higher tariffs to a maximum 
of 25%, Robert Zoellick called it the “Swiss 25” 
formula. See Statement of Robert B. Zoellick U.S. 
Trade Representative before the Committee on 
Agriculture of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
May 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-05-
21-agriculture.pdf. 
annual instalments over a five-year period. 
Curiously, the US went further and asked 
members to set a date for the eventual 
elimination of agricultural tariffs60 – a move 
that, if successful, could have given agriculture 
a further lead over manufactures.61 Knowing 
the sensitivity of agricultural issues in many 
WTO members, it was not difficult to dismiss 
this latter point as too ambitious for the Doha 
negotiations. Indeed, given that several 
agricultural tariffs in several member countries 
are bound at three digit levels, even the tariff 
harmonization formula that would set 25 
percent as the maximum for any tariff line was 
already an ambitious one. It is notable, 
however, that from quite early on there was a 
growing consensus to use some tariff 
harmonization mechanism – such as the Swiss 
formula – that would help to overcome the 
extreme tariff dispersion between different 
agricultural tariff lines.62  
 
Former Agriculture Committee chairman Stuart 
Harbinson’s first draft of the modalities 
proposed a three-tier distinction among 
agricultural products on the basis of their 
bound tariff levels, thus suggesting higher 
reduction rates for higher tariffs and lower 
reduction rates for lower tariffs.63 The draft 
(both original and revised versions) suggested 
that agricultural tariffs in excess of 90 per cent 
ad valorem be reduced by an average of 60 
per cent and a per-tariff-line minimum of 45 per 
cent; for those products with tariffs between 15 
and 90 per cent ad valorem, the average would 
be 50 per cent and the per-tariff-line minimum 
35 per cent; and for those products with tariffs 
                                                 
60  For the latest US positions, see 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm This 
is not accidental; the US argues that its agriculture 
is “more than twice as dependent on exports as 
the U.S. general economy. About 25 percent of 
gross cash receipts from agricultural sales are for 
export, compared with 10 percent on average for 
manufactured goods.” Debra Henke, “WTO 
Negotiations Offer the Best Chance for Agricultural 
Trade Reform”, AgExporter, November 2001. 
61  Note, however, that the US has also made a 
similarly ambitious proposal to eliminate all tariffs 
on all non-agricultural products by 2015. See 
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: 
Communication from the United States, 
TN/MA/W/18 (5 December 2002). Agriculture is 
already ahead of manufactures in terms of the 
proportion of tariff lines with bound rates. 
62  For more on the different formulae used in the 
trade negotiations, see WTO, Negotiating Group 
on Market Access: Formula Approaches To Tariff 
Negotiations – Note By The Secretariat 
(TN/MA/S/3/Rev.2, 11 April 2003).  
63  See first draft modalities, supra n. 2, paras. 7 and 
10; see also revised first draft modalities, supra n. 
2, paras. 8 and 12. 
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of 15 per cent ad valorem or lower, the 
average reduction requirement would be 40 
per cent and the per-tariff-line minimum 25 per 
cent.64 The modalities draft also proposed 
methods by which this tariff reduction formula 
would be applied in cases where members are 
applying non-ad valorem tariffs.65 If successful, 
this approach would have significantly reduced 
the current high level of tariff dispersion; it 
would not however have created anything like 
a maximum permissible tariff level.66 
 
The Harbinson draft also contained provisions 
intended to address the problem of tariff 
escalation – a situation where tariff rates rise 
with the degree of processing (i.e. higher tariff 
rates on more processed products than on 
primary or less processed forms of the same 
product). The original version of the modalities 
draft simply stated “where the tariff on a 
processed product is higher than the tariff for 
the product in its primary form, the tariff 
reduction for the processed product shall be 
higher than that for the product in its primary 
form.”67 The revised version further refined this 
higher-tariff-reduction requirement for the 
processed product to mean that “the rate of 
tariff reduction for the processed product shall 
be equivalent to that for the product in its 
primary form multiplied, at a minimum, by a 
factor of [1.3]”68  
 
The structure proposed for reductions by 
developing countries was even more 
complicated. Firstly, in recognition of the food 
security and rural development concerns of 
these countries, the proposal allowed them the 
right to declare an unspecified number of 
                                                 
64  See first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 7, and 
revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 8. 
65  Paragraph 9 of the revised first draft modalities 
provides as follows: “Where participants apply 
non-ad valorem tariffs, the allocation of any tariff 
item in categories (ii) and (iii) above shall be 
based on tariff equivalents to be calculated by the 
participant concerned in a transparent manner, 
using three-year average external reference prices 
or data, based on a recent representative five-year 
period, excluding the highest and the lowest entry. 
Full details of the method and data used for these 
calculations shall be included in the tables of 
supporting material for the draft Schedules and 
shall be subject to multilateral review.” 
66  According to Robert Zoellick, the Harbinson 
proposal on market access would result in an 
average agricultural tariff of 36 per cent (down 
from the current 62 per cent) while the US 
proposal would have cut them down to an average 
of 15 per cent. See Zoellick, supra n. 59. 
67  See first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 7, last 
indent. 
68  See revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 
8, last indent. 
products (presumably those that might be 
called food staples and/or export products) as 
“special products” – the original first draft 
modalities used the term “strategic products” – 
and designate them with the symbol “SP” in 
their schedules. These products would then be 
subject to a uniform requirement of 10 per cent 
average and 5 per cent per-tariff-line minimum 
reduction regardless of existing tariff levels. 
For all other – non-SP – products, the 
approach would be generally similar to that 
proposed for developed countries. But, in this 
case, the thresholds were higher, the rates of 
reduction lower, the number of categories 
bigger, and the implementation period longer.  
 
Accordingly, there are four categories of 
products here69: those with ad valorem tariffs 
higher than 120 per cent would be reduced by 
40 per cent average and 30 per cent per-tariff-
line minimum; those with tariffs between 60 
and 120 per cent by an average of 35 and a 
per-tariff-line minimum of 25 per cent; those 
with tariffs between 20 and 60 per cent by an 
average of 30 and a per-tariff-line minimum of 
20 per cent; and those with tariffs 20 per cent 
or lower ad valorem to be reduced by a 25 per 
cent average and a 15 per cent per-tariff-line 
minimum.70 These reduction commitments 
would also benefit from a longer 
implementation period – ten years as opposed 
to five years.  
 
While tariff reductions would naturally be a 
welcome development to international 
agricultural trade, many developing countries – 
and particularly LDCs – have been worried 
about the potential loss of competitive 
advantage due to erosion of the preferential 
margin that would necessarily result from 
reduction of MFN tariffs.71 In recognition of this, 
                                                 
69  Note that the original first draft modalities had 
three categories just like that for developed 
countries; a fourth category was introduced by the 
revised first draft modalities. 
70  See revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2,  para. 
12. 
71  Interestingly, this is a point that has been 
championed as much by the preference-providing 
countries as by the preference beneficiaries. In a 
comment entitled “Free farm trade means an 
unfair advantage” on the Financial Times, EU 
Agriculture and Trade Commissioners argued that 
“There cannot be a Doha deal unless developing 
countries are able to conclude that they have been 
treated fairly. But on market access, most of the 
proposals put by others in Geneva risked 
undermining developing countries that rely on 
preferential market access to European markets. 
Further market access must not become a blunt 
instrument for already powerful agricultural 
exporters to use against the developing world.” 
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the modalities draft proposed to impose a soft-
law, best-efforts, obligation on developed 
countries “to maintain, to the maximum extent 
technically feasible, the nominal margins of 
tariff preferences and other terms and 
conditions of preferential arrangements they 
accord to their developing trading partners.”72 
The modalities draft further proposed to allow 
developed countries to delay their tariff 
reductions on products of vital export interest 
to preference beneficiaries (defined to mean a 
product constituting at least 20 per cent of their 
total merchandise exports) by two years and 
then to implement the reductions over another 
six year period. In-quota duties for such 
products would also be eliminated. Finally, the 
modalities draft also contained the usual loose 
undertaking by developed countries to provide 
“targeted technical assistance programmes 
and other measures, as appropriate, to support 
preference-receiving countries in efforts to 
diversify their economies and exports.”73 But, 
of course, this one is a hollow promise with 
little, if any, practical significance.  
Annex A to the pre-Cancun draft contained a 
proposed “Framework for Establishing 
Modalities in Agriculture”, which was based 
largely on the ‘US-EU joint proposal’74 and the 
‘pre-Cancun G20 proposal’.75 All these three 
documents are unanimous in their approach to 
tariff reductions – they all advocate what is 
called a “blended formula”, first suggested by 
the US-EU joint text proposing to divide all 
agricultural tariff lines into three groups. The 
first group would be subject to a Uruguay 
Round style average tariff cut with a mandatory 
per-tariff-line minimum; the second category 
would be subject to a Swiss formula with a 
                                                                       
See Franz Fischler and Pascal Lamy, Financial 
Times, 1st April 2003, p. 19. For an in-depth 
analysis of the impact of further reductions in MFN 
agricultural tariffs on the interest of preference-
beneficiary developing countries, see Stephan 
Tangermann, “The Future of Preferential Trade 
Agreements for Developing Countries and the 
Current Round of WTO Negotiations on 
Agriculture” (Paper prepared for FAO/ESCP, April 
2001).  
72  See revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2,  para. 
16. 
73  See revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 
16.  
74  See supra n. 3. 
75  See supra n. 4. The proposal from this group was 
severely criticised by the EU. EU agriculture 
commissioner Franz Fischler has been quoted as 
saying: "Do not reach for the stars in order to get 
the moon." Likewise, EU trade commissioner 
Pascal Lamy said: "When I see the extreme 
proposal co-sponsored by Brazil, India and some 
others, I cannot help (but get) the impression that 
they are circling on a different orbit." AFP News, 
September 4, 2003. 
coefficient; and a third one would be subject to 
the famous zero-for-zero approach on which all 
tariffs would be eliminated. The specific 
percentage of tariff lines that would be subject 
to each category, the average and per-tariff-
line minimum reductions in the first category, 
as well as the coefficient in the second 
category were all to be left for the post Cancun 
phase.  
However, the similarities between the three 
documents on market access do not extend 
much beyond this point. The pre-Cancun G20 
proposal to put a cap on the maximum 
permissible tariff level was replaced in the 
Cancun draft by an alternative between tariff 
capping and the introduction of an effective 
additional market access in those or other 
areas through a request-offer process, a 
position taken from the ‘US-EU joint proposal’. 
At Cancun, ministers spent most of their time 
on agriculture and the revised draft ministerial 
declaration (the Cancun draft) circulated on 13 
September 2003 (i.e. one day before the 
conclusion of the session) closely followed the 
pre-Cancun draft in most cases. On the issue 
of tariff reductions, the Cancun draft reaffirmed 
the blended formula of the pre-Cancun draft 
without much change. The only important 
modifications to this part of the pre-Cancun 
draft relate to non-trade concerns and tariff 
escalation on which the Cancun draft echoed 
the Harbinson revised first modalities draft.76  
 
2. Negotiations on Tariff Reductions: 
from Cancun to Hong Kong 
 
Cancun was a failure and any proposals on the 
table until that time are only part of the 
negotiating history of whatever comes out of 
this whole process. The first real breakthrough 
came in the form of the July package.  
 
The July 2004 package adopted a ‘tiered’ 
approach to the reduction of tariffs, which is 
just one form of what is traditionally known as 
the Swiss Formula that aims to cut higher 
tariffs more deeply than lower tariffs – thereby 
resulting in higher level of tariff harmonisation. 
The July package calls it “progressivity in tariff 
reductions”.77 All members, except LDCs, are 
required to reduce their tariffs according to this 
approach. The size of the cuts is however still 
under negotiation, and needs to be resolved in 
order for those elusive modalities to be 
achieved. The July package already provides 
that tariff cuts, whatever their size, will apply 
from bound levels as opposed to applied ones. 
                                                 
76  See supra n. 3 and accompanying text.  
77  See July Package, supra n. 5, para. 29. 
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The high levels of agricultural tariff waters (i.e. 
the differences between bound and applied 
rates) particularly in developing countries will 
thus mean that the effect of such a reduction 
will be minimal in the short term.78  
Progressivity in tariff reductions would be 
possible only if tariffs across products are 
comparable in some objective form. The 
agriculture schedules of many WTO members 
are however made up of different forms of 
tariffs – such as ad valorem, specific, mixed 
and compound.79 Comparison of tariff levels 
across different products is most 
straightforward in cases where tariff levels are 
expressed in ad valorem terms. However, 
unlike for non-agricultural products,80 the July 
package does not expressly require conversion 
of non-ad valorem agricultural tariffs into their 
ad valorem equivalents (AVEs). The 
conversion of the many non-ad valorem 
agricultural tariffs to their AVEs was 
nonetheless found to be a necessary 
precondition for the achievement of 
progressivity in agricultural tariff reductions, as 
it would otherwise be difficult, if not impossible, 
to allocate specific tariff lines in the different 
tiers that will be subject to different levels of 
cuts.81  
                                                 
78  That is probably why EU trade commissioner 
Peter Mandelson said he could not envisage a 
Doha Round that would be concluded on the basis 
of “real cuts by Europe, paper cuts by others.” 
Quoted in Bridges Weekly Trade News digest, Vol. 
10, No. 2, 25 January 2006, available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-01-25/story1.htm.  
79  For comprehensive information on this see WTO 
Committee on Agriculture, Special Session: 
Calculation of Ad Valorem Equivalents (AVEs): 
Data Requirements and Availability, Note by the 
Secretariat (TN/AG/S/11, 15 November 2004). 
According to this survey, the WTO Consolidated 
Tariff Schedules Database contains 7,977 
agricultural tariff lines that are bound in non-ad 
valorem terms by a total of 35 Members, counting 
the EC(15) and Switzerland-Liechtenstein, 
respectively, as one. See para. 5. Among the 35 
members with non-ad valorem agricultural tariffs 
are Australia, Canada, the EC, India, Japan, 
Norway, Switzerland, and the US. 
80  Paragraph 5 of Annex B of the July Package on 
the Framework for Establishing Modalities in 
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products 
provides: “all non-ad valorem duties shall be 
converted to ad valorem equivalents on the basis 
of a methodology to be determined and bound in 
ad valorem terms.” 
81  It is not clear whether members will use the AVEs 
only during the negotiation process for the 
allocation of particular tariff lines in the appropriate 
tiers while retaining their existing non-ad valorem 
tariffs in their final schedules. A couple of 
considerations suggest that this to be a possibility: 
(1) the inclusion of a specific commitment 
prohibiting such possibility for non-agricultural 
products and its absence for agricultural products; 
The AVE calculation proved much more 
difficult than initially thought. Technical issues 
relating to methods of calculation, choice of 
data and data sources for the purpose and 
questions of verification procedures all 
combined to slow down progress in the 
negotiations. The problems in calculation 
methodology centred around two alternative 
methods, the “unit price method” and the 
“revenue method”. In a unit price method, the 
AVE would be derived from a given specific 
duty (e.g. in USD) as a percentage of a given 
reference price (e.g. also in USD). In other 
words, the AVE is calculated as the specific 
duty expressed as a percentage of the unit 
value of a product. In a revenue method, on 
the other hand, the AVE would be derived from 
the total tariff revenue of a member from the 
importation of a particular product over a given 
period as a percentage of total value of imports 
of the same product over the same period. The 
AVEs in this case are thus calculated directly 
from data on customs revenue collected for a 
particular product divided by the value of 
imports of the same product and expressed in 
percentage terms.82 The value of products in 
either case would have to be set based on the 
world market prices of products.  
 
In a manner reminiscent of the issues 
surrounding the agricultural tariffication 
exercise of the Uruguay Round, the root cause 
of the problem now lies with the interest of 
members with high protection levels to ensure 
that the effect of the AVE conversion exercise 
would still leave as wide a room as possible to 
protect their markets after the Doha reductions 
have been completed.83 The presence of 
sometimes widely diverging data on world 
market prices and volumes for some 
                                                                       
and (2) the attempt by agricultural exporters to 
push for an AVE conversion methodology that 
would lead to higher AVEs and be subject to 
steeper tariff reductions and the importers’ 
preferences for the opposite scenario.  
82  See Id. Para. 7 and 8. [WTO Committee on 
Agriculture, Special Session: Calculation of Ad 
Valorem Equivalents (AVEs): Data Requirements 
and Availability, Note by the Secretariat 
(TN/AG/S/11, 15 November 2004)] 
83  As summarised by the ICTSD, “AVE conversion 
has pitted the EU and G-10 countries against the 
US, the Cairns group of agricultural exporters and 
the G-20. The former groups make use of a large 
number of specific tariffs. Agricultural exporters 
would like to see the conversion based more 
closely on the lower world prices, which would 
lead to higher AVEs, and eventually, steeper tariff 
cuts.” ICTSD, “Agriculture: Key Trade Ministers 
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agricultural products (e.g. between the WTO’s 
Integrated Database (IDB) and the United 
Nations Statistical Division Commodity Trade 
Statistics database (Comtrade)) meant that the 
level of protection available for a country after 
Doha would partly depend on the choice of 
databases to determine the relevant world 
market prices. This technical hurdle was 
overcome at a Paris “mini-ministerial” meeting 
in May 2005 in which a group of leading WTO 
members agreed to use IDB and Comtrade 
data with a complex formula on their weighting 
and sequencing.84  
 
The July package left the number of bands, the 
thresholds for defining the bands and the level 
of tariff reduction in each band for subsequent 
negotiations.85 Several proposals have been 
submitted between the July package and the 
Hong Kong ministerial. To give just a few 
examples, the EC proposed to have four 
bands, with the highest tier subject to a 60 
percent reduction, and a 100 percent tariff cap. 
Developing countries would be subject to less 
onerous commitments in the form of higher 
thresholds for each of the four tiers and lower 
reduction requirements within each; the cap for 
developing countries would be set at 150 
percent.86 The US on its part also proposed a 
four-tier system of cutting tariffs, but the 
thresholds for each tier are lower, the reduction 
rates higher (the highest being subject to a 90 
percent cut), and a tariff cap of 75 percent for 
developed countries.87 Likewise, the G20 also 
proposed a four-tier structure, but with 
reduction ambitions falling somewhere 
between the EC and the US’s.88 This growing 
consensus on the structure of the tiers for 
agricultural tariff reductions and the divergence 
on the thresholds were reflected in the text of 
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration which 
                                                 
84  For more on this, see Id. [ICTSD, “Agriculture: Key 
Trade Ministers Strike AVE Deal in Paris”, 11 May 
2005, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-
05-11/BRIDGESWeekly9-16.pdf.] See also FAO, 
“Tariff Reduction Formulae: Methodological Issues 
in Assessing their Effects” in FAO Trade Policy 
Technical Notes No. 2 (Rome 2004). 
85  See July Package, supra n. 5, para. 30. 
86  See EC Commission, Making Hong Kong a 




87  See U.S. Proposal for Bold Reform in Global 
Agriculture Trade (Dec. 2005) available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact
_Sheets/2005/asset_upload_file281_8526.pdf  
88  See G20 Proposal on Market Access, 12 October 
2005, available at 
http://www.ictsd.org/ministerial/hongkong/docs/G2
0proposal.pdf.  
stated that “We adopt four bands for 
structuring tariff cuts, recognizing that we need 
now to agree on the relevant thresholds – 
including those applicable for developing 
country Members.”89 The search for a 
modalities agreement in respect of the tariff 
reduction formula is therefore a search for 
acceptable thresholds within these four bands 
and, possibly, fixing a cap for the maximum 
permissible tariff levels for both developed and 
developing countries.  
 
However, the July package also introduced the 
concept of “sensitive products”, which are 
different from the “special products” introduced 
earlier. Under the July package, the 
commitment to progressivity in tariff reductions 
is subject to “flexibilities for sensitive products”. 
Accordingly, members are entitled to 
“designate an appropriate number, to be 
negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as 
sensitive, taking account of existing 
commitments for these products.”90 The extent 
to which any flexibilities in favour of sensitive 
products will shield their tariffs from the 
reduction formulae that will be agreed in the 
future is still far from clear. The July package 
hints that there will be “deviations from the 
tariff formula”,91 but the degree of this deviation 
and the conditions under which it could be 
allowed have yet to be negotiated. Apart from 
that, the July package adopts a negative 
approach in the sense that it tells us only what 
the special treatment of sensitive products will 
not be rather than what it will be.92 Thanks to 
the vagueness of the language of the market 
access commitment in the July package, it still 
declares that designating a product as 
sensitive will not mean less-than-substantial 
improvement in market access in that product. 
Moreover, the July package also left for future 
negotiations such issues as the number of tariff 
lines that could be designated as sensitive 
products and the manner and criteria of their 
selection. Post-July package proposals on the 
number of products, for example, range from 
one percent to 15 percent of tariff lines93 and 
Hong Kong was not able to bridge this gap. 
The Ministerial Declaration simply recognized 
“the need to agree on treatment of sensitive 
products, taking into account all the elements 
involved”. The importance of the decision 
awaiting negotiators in this respect is a crucial 
                                                 
89  See Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra n. 6, 
para. 7. 
90  See July Package, supra n. 5, para. 31. 
91  See Id., para. 34. 
92  See Id., paras. 32-34.  
93  See Annex A to the Hong Kong Declaration, supra 
n. 6, p. A-5.  
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one which could have implications for the 
overall direction of agricultural trade rules vis-
à-vis rules applying to trade in other products. 
 
Finally, the July package also allowed 
developing countries the flexibility “to 
designate an appropriate number of products 
as Special Products, based on criteria of food 
security, livelihood security and rural 
development needs.”94 Once again, however, 
the details as to the number of products to be 
so designated, their manner of selection and 
the degree of flexibility they would enjoy were 
left for subsequent negotiations. All the Hong 
Kong declaration did in this respect was to 
clarify that developing countries would be 
entitled to self-designate their special products 
provided they are “an appropriate number” and 
guided by indicators based on the criteria of 
food security, livelihood security and rural 
development.95 It is notable that developing 
countries have this right to self-designate 
special products in addition to their right to 
designate another category of sensitive 
products which will have to be negotiated just 
like the developed countries. The right to 
designate products as sensitive or special is 
not applicable to LDCs as they are already 
exempted from any tariff reduction 
commitments.96  
The issues of sensitive and special products 
have been among the most controversial in the 
later phase of the negotiations. The lesson one 
could get from the Uruguay Round is also 
limited, the only relevant one being the special 
treatment option that was invented primarily to 
address the sensitivities of rice in Japan and 
Korea who were allowed conditional exemption 
from the tariffication requirement in return for 
higher minimum access commitments. Given 
that all agricultural products are currently 
subject only to tariffs, the only way a special 
treatment could apply to a selected group of 
sensitive or special products is in the form of 
tariff cuts less than the otherwise applicable 
rate for the tier in which such products would 
fall.  
 
B. TARIFF RATE QUOTAS 
(TRQS) AND THEIR 
ADMINISTRATION  
 
As noted earlier TRQs were introduced mainly 
to implement the minimum and/or current 
access commitments of the Agreement on 
                                                 
94  See July Package, supra n. 5, para. 41. 
95  See Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, supra n. 6, 
para. 7. 
96  See July package, supra n. 5, para. 45. 
Agriculture.97 In order to satisfy these 
requirements, countries had to introduce a two-
tier tariff structure made up of the normal 
bound rate resulting from the tariffication 
process (the out-of-quota rate) and a lower 
rate (the in-quota rate) designed to enable the 
importation of an amount equal to the 
minimum/current access commitment levels for 
a particular product in a particular country. 
Some three interrelated issues have been 
raised during the negotiations in this respect: 
firstly, there is concern that the required in-
quota quantity is too small in many cases and 
therefore needs expansion; secondly, most of 
these already small in-quota quantities 
themselves have often remained unfilled98; and 
thirdly, trade-restrictive methods of TRQ 
administration, some of which smacked of the 
pre-Uruguay Round NTBs, have contributed to 
the under-fill.  
 
In response to the concern that in-quota 
volumes have been too small, the Harbinson 
first modalities draft suggested that tariff quota 
volumes be set at a minimum level of 10 per 
cent of domestic consumption in every such 
product, with the flexibility that members could 
set an 8 per cent commitment on as much as 
25 per cent of these products provided they 
undertake a 12 per cent commitment on 
another 25 per cent of products. Importantly for 
most developing countries, the modalities draft 
proposed to abolish tariffs on in-quota volumes 
for tropical products, raw as well as processed, 
and for what are called products of particular 
importance to the diversification of production 
away from narcotic and other illicit products. 
The implementation period for this commitment 
was to be five years.  
 
Again in pursuance of the special and 
differential treatment principle, the modalities 
draft proposed two things here: firstly, 
developing countries would be exempted from 
the requirement to expand in-quota volumes 
for their “special products”; and secondly, they 
would be entitled to lower levels of in-quota 
volume expansion on other products: an 
                                                 
97  According to the WTO Secretariat, as of 8 March 
2002, 43 Members have tariff quota commitments 
for a total of 1425 individual tariff lines. See Tariff 
and Other Quotas: Background Paper by the 
Secretariat, WTO doc. TN/AG/S/5, 21 March 
2002, para. 6. 
98  According to the WTO Secretariat, the average 
TRQ fill rate for the six-year implementation period 
varied between 66% for 1995 and 60% for 2000. 
See WTO Secretariat, Tariff Quota Administration 
Methods and Tariff Quota Fill: Background Paper 
by the Secretariat (WTO doc. TN/AG/S/6) 22 
March 2002, para. 17, Table 5. 
15
Melaku Geboye Desta: Legal issues in international agricultural trade 
 
 
Legal Papers Online 
May 2006 
average of 6.6 per cent of domestic 
consumption with the flexibility to undertook a 
5 per cent commitment on 25 per cent of their 
products provided they also undertake an 8 per 
cent commitment on another 25 per cent of 
products.99 Developing countries would also 
benefit from an implementation period of ten 
years.  
 
Finally, the revised first modalities draft 
attempted to further strengthen the discipline 
governing in-quota trade by requiring reduction 
of in-quota tariffs in all cases where the 
average tariff rate quota fill rate was below 65 
per cent.100 This would potentially mean 
virtually all tariff quotas since the fill rate over 
the implementation period for Uruguay Round 
commitments almost always stood below 65 
per cent – the only exception being 1995, the 
first year of the implementation period for 
which the fill rate was 66 per cent.101  
While all the above market access issues have 
played a part in the Doha negotiations102, a lot 
of attention has been – rightly – focused on the 
problem of TRQ administration. Members have 
so far used a variety of means in administering 
their TRQs. The most important ones are the 
following: applied tariffs103; first-come, first-
served104; licences on demand105; 
auctioning106; historical importers107; imports 
undertaken by state trading entities108; and 
                                                 
99  See revised first modalities draft, supra n. 2, para. 
20. 
100  See Id., para. 22. 
101  See WTO doc. TN/AG/S/5, supra n. 97, para. 51, 
Table 4.  
102  Many agree that TRQs should be expanded but 
often do not mention by how much; the US has 
proposed a 20 percent increase together with 
elimination of in-quota tariffs.  
103  This is a situation where the in-quota tariff rate is 
applied as though it were an ordinary tariff without 
any tariff rate quota and imports are allowed in 
unlimited quantities at that rate. 
104  This is a situation where “imports are permitted 
entry at the in-quota tariff rates until such a time as 
the tariff quota is filled; then the higher tariff 
automatically applies.  The physical importation of 
the good determines the order and hence the 
applicable tariff.” See WTO doc. TN/AG/S/6, supra 
n. 98, para. 5, Table 1. 
105  This is a situation where “importers' shares are 
generally allocated, or licences issued, in relation 
to quantities demanded and often prior to the 
commencement of the period during which the 
physical importation is to take place.” See Id.. 
106  Here “importers' shares are allocated, or licences 
issued, largely on the basis of an auctioning or 
competitive bid system.” See Id. 
107  In this case “importers' shares are allocated, or 
licences issued, principally in relation to past 
imports of the product concerned.” See Id. 
108  Here “import shares are allocated entirely or 
mainly to a state trading entity which imports (or 
producer groups or associations.109 These 
“principal” methods have sometimes been 
supplemented by “additional” conditions which 
included domestic purchase requirements, 
limits on tariff quota shares per allocation, 
export certificates, and past trading 
performance.110 While some of these TRQ 
administration methods (such as the use of 
applied tariffs) facilitate realization of the AoA’s 
long-term objective of establishing a fair and 
market-oriented agricultural trading system, 
some others (such as auctioning and the 
domestic purchase requirements) could, 
arguably, even be challenged for their WTO-
compatibility. The lack of transparency and 
predictability surrounding their application in 
many member countries has further 
exacerbated the problem. The Doha 
negotiations have thus rightly spent a lot of 
time and energy on the issue. The first 
Harbinson draft of the modalities proposed a 
long provision on TRQ administration 
containing a mixture of three approaches: 
restatement of the basic principles (of 
transparency and predictability), a positive list 
of do’s (such as requiring all in-quota imports 
to be from MFN suppliers) and a negative list 
of don’ts (such as domestic purchasing 
requirements). Indeed this first draft shows a 
tendency to outlaw such prevalent practices as 
the allocation of import licences only to 
domestic producer groups/associations, the 
setting of exportation or re-exportation 
requirements as conditions for import permits, 
and even auctioning.111 The parts of the 
Harbinson draft dealing with TRQ 
administration were also among the areas on 
which relatively less displeasure was 
expressed by the negotiators in the run-up to 
Cancun and the Cancun draft hardly said 
anything about TRQ administration. 
 
The July package did not say much on TRQs 
and their administration. It simply envisaged 
the possibility of “reduction or elimination of in-
quota tariff rates, and operationally effective 
                                                                       
has direct control of imports undertaken by 
intermediaries) the product concerned.” See Id. 
109  In this case “import shares are allocated entirely or 
mainly to a producer group or association which 
imports (or has direct control of imports 
undertaken by the relevant Member) the product 
concerned.” See Id. 
110  See Id. Table 2. 
111  A relevant part of the first modalities draft provided 
as follows: “No charges, deposits or other financial 
requirements shall be imposed, directly or 
indirectly, on or in connection with the 
administration of tariff quota commitments or with 
importation of tariff quota products other than as 
permitted under the GATT 1994.” Attachment 1 to 
the first draft modalities, supra n. 2,  para. 2(i). 
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improvements in tariff quota administration”.112 
The Hong Kong declaration does not even 
mention the issue of TRQs. However, the 
amount of detailed work done prior to the 
Cancun ministerial, coupled with the growing 
consensus that prevailed at the time about the 
need to resolve the problem of TRQs and their 
administration could suggest that the 
Harbinson modalities proposals may still play a 
role in future negotiations.  
 
C. SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL 
SAFEGUARD (SSG) 
 
As noted earlier, the special safeguard 
provision was introduced to enable members 
to impose additional duties on the importation 
of products subject to tariffication in the event 
of unexpected import surges or price slumps 
without the need to prove injury as would 
otherwise be required under general 
safeguards rules. This right would exist only in 
respect of products for which countries 
expressly reserved the right to do so by putting 
the SSG symbol in their schedules of 
commitments. According to WTO data, 39 
Members have reserved the right to use the 
special safeguard option on hundreds of 
products; but so far only 10 Members have 
used it “in one or several of the years 1995 to 
2001”.113 This situation, coupled with its 
obvious trade-distortive impacts, has prompted 
many countries, including the US, the Cairns 
Group114 and several developing countries, to 
demand its elimination. Others, including the 
EC115 and Japan116, have proposed to keep it 
stressing the fact that the AoA foresees its 
duration throughout the reform process.  
 
The original version of the Harbinson 
modalities draft suggested eliminating the 
special safeguard option for developed 
countries over an agreed transition period 
while maintaining a modified version of it for 
so-called “strategic products” of developing 
                                                 
112  See July package, supra n. 5, para. 35.  
113  WTO, Special Agricultural Safeguard: Background 
Paper by the Secretariat: Revision, WTO doc: 
G/AG/NG/S/9/Rev.1, 19 February 2002, para. 3. 
114  WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Cairns Group 
Negotiating Proposal: Market Access, WTO doc. 
G/AG/NG/W/54, 10 November 2000. 
115  EC Comprehensive Negotiating Proposal, WTO 
doc. G/AG/NG/W/90, 15 December 2000, para. 4. 
116  See Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO 
Agricultural Negotiations (WTO doc. 
G/AG/NG/W/91) 21 December 2000, Para. 15. 
Indeed, Japan goes even further and proposes the 
introduction of a new safeguard mechanism to 
apply with respect to seasonal and perishable 
agricultural products. See para. 14. 
countries.117 The revised version of the same 
draft dropped the reference to “strategic 
products” for developing countries and 
envisaged the application of a “special 
safeguard mechanism” (SSM) by these 
countries on a wider range of products and 
under defined circumstances.118 Both the pre-
Cancun draft agricultural framework as well as 
its Cancun counterpart simply noted that the 
SSG was still under negotiation. Both 
confirmed, however, that “a special agricultural 
safeguard (SSM) shall be established for use 
by developing countries subject to conditions 
and for products to be determined.” This was 
also the position suggested by the ‘US-EU joint 
proposal’119 and the ‘pre-Cancun G20 
proposal’ few weeks prior to Cancun.120 
 
The July package and the Hong Kong 
declaration also leave the fate of the SSG 
open while reaffirming the commitment to 
establish the SSM for developing countries. 
The Hong Kong declaration went further and 
provided that the SSM will be triggered by 
import quantity surges and price falls just like 
the SSG, but leaves the detailed arrangements 
for future negotiations. Now that the 
introduction of a developing countries-version 
of the SSG is already certain, two questions 
might be asked: firstly, how beneficial will the 
SSM be for developing countries, and what are 
the political implications of such a development 
particularly in terms of the fate of the SSG.  
The first question, i.e. the practical usefulness 
of the SSM, is relevant in that most developing 
countries have more than enough ‘water’ 
between their bound and applied tariffs, and it 
is legal to use this water in response to any 
future unduly low-priced imports or surges in 
import quantities. As the Appellate Body 
observed in Chile Price Band, “A Member may, 
fully in accordance with Article II of the GATT 
1994, exact a duty upon importation and 
periodically change the rate at which it applies 
that duty (provided the changed rates remain 
below the tariff rates bound in the Member's 
Schedule). This change in the applied rate of 
duty could be made, for example, through an 
act of a Member's legislature or executive at 
any time.”121 The agreement in the July 
package to make tariff reductions from bound 
rates rather than applied rates was considered 
                                                 
117  See first draft modalities, supra n. 2, paras. 23 and 
24. 
118  See revised first draft modalities, supra n. 2, para. 
26.  
119  See supra n. 4. 
120  See supra n. 4. 
121  See Chile Price Band, AB report, supra n. 55, 
para. 232. 
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a victor for developing countries mainly 
because it is mainly in the developing countries 
that we find significant differences between 
these two tariff rates. Here also comes the 
second concern – that an SSM for developing 
countries will legitimize the case for the SSG. 
In other words, negotiations are always about 
give and take; there is always a price to be 
paid for any interest pursued by any country or 
grouping, and the fear is that the right for an 
SSM secured by the developing countries may 
be purchased at the price of accepting the 
continued existence of the SSG whose 
beneficiaries are the developed countries. At 
least from the perspective of most developing 
countries, this is not a price worth paying for an 
SSM that may not be of any use in practice. 
Moreover, in both cases, it is the long-term 
objective of achieving a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system that will 
suffer the most.  
 
D. CONCLUSION ON MARKET 
ACCESS  
 
In sum, the agricultural market access issues 
in the current negotiations present some of the 
most complex issues of international trade. 
Despite these complexities, however, the 
market access part of the agricultural 
negotiations appears to be progressing 
relatively well and there is some room to be 
optimistic and expect significant reductions in 
tariffs, some expansion in TRQs, and a more 
rigorous discipline governing TRQ 
administration. Most importantly for developing 
countries, market access is the only area in 
which the principle of special and differential 
treatment is being pursued with a promise of a 
meaningful outcome. It is also notable that 
developed and willing developing countries 
have already committed themselves in the 
Hong Kong declaration to implement duty-free 
and quota-free market access for a minimum 
of 97 percent of products originating from 









                                                 
122  See Hong Kong declaration, supra n. 6, para. 47 
together with Annex F thereof. 
IV. AGRICULTURAL 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES 




A. BACKGROUND  
 
The AoA defines export subsidies as 
“subsidies contingent upon export 
performance”.123 This formulation however 
raises the more basic question of what a 
“subsidy” is – a concept defined only by the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures124 (the SCM Agreement). According 
to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy 
is a financial contribution made by a 
government or any public body conferring a 
benefit on the recipient.  
Under the original text of GATT, subsidies, 
whether export or domestic, were not subject 
to any strict discipline. The only thing countries 
had to do was notify their subsidies and, if they 
were found to have any serious adverse 
impact on the trade interests of other countries, 
to discuss about the possibility of limiting the 
subsidization.125 During the 1954/55 GATT 
review session, Article XVI was modified and a 
two-tier distinction was introduced between 
domestic and export subsidies, on the one 
hand, and between export subsidies on 
primary and non-primary products on the other. 
The resulting regime kept domestic subsidies 
as legitimate instruments of support subject 
only to the old obligations of notification and 
consultation, while it put export subsidies 
under a stronger discipline. More specifically, 
export subsidies on non-primary products were 
prohibited if they resulted in the sale of export 
items at a price lower than their domestic 
market (often called the “dual pricing” 
requirement). But, the same export subsidies 
were permitted on non-primary products, 
subject only to the vague and impracticable 
condition that they did not use them to acquire 
a “more than equitable share of world export 
trade in that product”.  
 
                                                 
123  See Article 1(e) of the AoA. 
124  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (hereafter the SCM Agreement) in Final 
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, 15 
April 1994. 
125  See Article XVI, Section A. For a more extensive 
survey of this subject, see Desta (2002), supra n. 
52, Chapter 4. 
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Attempts were made during subsequent 
rounds of trade negotiations to bring export 
subsidies on primary products under the same 
rules as those applying to non-primary 
products. But this was all in vain. For example, 
during the Tokyo Round (1973 – 1979), a 
separate (‘plurilateral-type’) agreement was 
concluded addressing the issue of subsidies 
and countervailing duties, often known as the 
Subsidies Code.126 This Code strengthened 
the export subsidies discipline of non-primary 
products by abolishing the “dual pricing” 
requirement and introducing a flat prohibition of 
them, but its provisions on export subsidies on 
“certain primary products” (redefined to 
exclude minerals from the old concept) were 
nothing more than the use of new words 
repeating old stories. As a result, agricultural 
export subsidies were freely and extensively 
used especially by developed countries until 
the Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994.  
 
The Uruguay Round brought an important 
change to this situation not just through the 
conclusion of the AoA but also the generic 
SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement itself 
has introduced substantial changes to the law 
of subsidies in general. Employing a “traffic 
light approach”, this Agreement puts all 
subsidies into either of three boxes: “red” or 
prohibited, “amber” or actionable, and “green” 
or non-actionable. Falling in the “red” box are 
export subsidies and what are often called 
import substitution subsidies (i.e. subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic over 
imported products). The “green” box covered 
all non-specific subsidies as well as three 
types of specific subsidies: research and 
development subsidies, regional development 
subsidies targeting disadvantaged regions, and 
environmental subsidies to promote adaptation 
to new legal requirements. The “amber” box 
covers a residual category of subsidies (all 
non-red and non-green) against which action 
may be taken if they cause adverse trade 
effects to the interests of others. The discipline 
contained in the SCM Agreement is generic 
(as it applies to all sectors) but it often 
expressly excludes agricultural subsidies from 
its coverage. Yet provisions of the SCM 
Agreement could still affect agricultural trade in 
at least two ways: filling any loopholes that 
may, and do, exist within the subsidies 
provisions of the AoA, and serving as a 
principal contextual guide for the interpretation 
of relevant AoA provisions. However, as the 
Canada Dairy saga has shown, the 
                                                 
126  Agreement on Interpretation and Application of 
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General 
Agreement, BISD 26S/56 (1980). 
relationship between the AoA and the SCM 
Agreement can be more complicated than 
this.127  
 
Export subsidies flatly prohibited by the SCM 
Agreement are expressly permitted by the AoA 
in the agricultural sector. Indeed agriculture is 
the only sector where export subsidies are 
legal. The AoA has created two categories of 
export subsidies — listed and non-listed — 
each subject to distinct disciplines. Listed 
agricultural export subsidies (as under AoA 
Article 9.1) have generally been subject to 
reduction commitments of a dual nature – 
quantitative (by 21%) and budgetary (by 36%) 
– on a 1986-1990 base period and over a six-
year implementation period. Developing 
countries were required to undertake only two-
thirds of these obligations to be implemented 
over a period of ten years. This means that 
those countries that were providing export 
subsidies during the base period would be 
allowed to continue to do so on condition that 
they undertook, and remained within, specific 
reduction commitments. Those countries that 
had not been providing such export subsidies 
during the base period – almost by definition 
developing countries – have been prohibited 
from providing any export subsidies. Following 
this process, 25 WTO members have 
scheduled export subsidy reduction 
commitments in respect of different 
products.128 This also means that only these 
25 countries are allowed to use the export 
subsidies listed in Article 9.1 of the AoA and on 
the products they have scheduled in their 
commitments. As regards non-listed export 
subsidies, the only limitation is that they may 
not be used in a manner which results in, or 
which threatens to lead to, circumvention of 
export subsidy commitments.129 Article 10.2 
goes a step further and picks up three forms of 
non-listed export support practices, including 
export credit schemes, and declares that 
Members shall undertake to work toward the 
development of internationally agreed 
                                                 
127  See Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
reports of both the panel and the Appellate Body, 
WT/DS113 and WT/DS103 (hereafter Canada 
Dairy). 
128  The countries are: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
European Communities, Hungary, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Panama, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
South Africa, Switzerland-Liechtenstein, Turkey, 
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See 
Export Subsidies: Background Paper by the 
Secretariat, TN/AG/S/8, 9 April 2002, para. 4. 
129  See Article 10.1 of the AoA. 
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disciplines governing their use. To the 
disappointment of many Members, including 
the EC, however, no such agreement was 
reached due largely to US opposition.  
 
Agricultural export subsidies have long been 
perceived as the most contentious, and 
especially from the perspective of developing 
countries, the most destructive trade policy 
instruments. However, the users of these 
subsidies, particularly the EC, have been 
strongly opposed to any moves to eliminate 
agricultural export subsidies and bring the 
rules of agricultural trade in line with those 
applying to non-agricultural products. The 
Doha Declaration was thus considered a 
breakthrough when it provided, in relevant part, 
that “building on the work carried out to date 
and without prejudging the outcome of the 
negotiations we commit ourselves to 
comprehensive negotiations aimed at … 
reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all 
forms of export subsidies.”130 Success and 
failure for the entire Doha ministerial 
conference were hanging until the very last 
minute on the inclusion or otherwise of the 
underlined phrase in this declaration.131  
 
B. EXPORT SUBSIDIES: 
NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ROAD 
TO CANCUN  
 
Agricultural export subsidies continue to be 
one of the most contentious throughout the 
Doha negotiations. Although there have been a 
wide range of proposals on this issue, one can 
generally say that the vast majority132 
demanded the phasing out of export subsidies 
while a small minority, led by the EC, was 
initially prepared to consider only reductions 
and not total abolition. Reflecting this 
overwhelming demand for the phasing out of 
export subsidies, the Harbinson first draft of 
modalities proposed a formula by which 50 
                                                 
130  Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra n. 34, para. 13 
(emphasis added). 
131  Guy De Jonquiers & Francis Williams, Trade Talks 
Falter Over Farm Subsidy Deal, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2001, at 2 (noting France objected to 
“wording in the draft WTO agenda that calls for 
negotiations with a ‘view to phasing out’ all farm 
export subsidies”). 
132  The US, the Cairns Group, the Africa Group, 
ASEAN, WAEMU, etc. are all in this group. But 
some developing countries, such as India, which 
call for the abolition of export subsidies also 
propose that developing countries be allowed to 
keep the preferential treatment they currently 
enjoy under Article 9.4 of the AoA and other 
benefits.  
percent of export subsidies (in budgetary as 
well as quantitative terms) would be phased 
out over a five year period while the other half 
would be phased out over nine years, in both 
cases at equal annual instalments.133 For 
developing countries, this same approach was 
proposed to be implemented over a period of 
10 and 12 years respectively, while keeping 
the exemptions of AoA Article 9.4 intact.134 
Curiously enough, the revised first modalities 
draft made almost no change to this section of 
the original draft.  
 
However, the disagreement over export 
subsidies continued until the last minutes in the 
preparation for Cancun. The ‘US-EU joint 
proposal’ suggested eliminating export 
subsidies only on products of particular export 
interest to developing countries over an agreed 
period. The proposed framework from the ‘G20 
countries’ suggested to eliminate all export 
subsidies with some hint that export subsidies 
on products of particular export interest to 
developing countries would be eliminated 
within a shorter time frame than other 
products. The pre-Cancun draft framework 
prepared by General Council Chairman del 
Castillo took refugee in another vague 
language, proposing to eliminate export 
subsidies on products of particular export 
interest for developing countries over an 
agreed period while, on other products, 
proposing that members “shall commit to 
reduce, with a view to phasing out, budgetary 
and quantity allowances for export subsidies”. 
In the words of the pre-Cancun draft 
framework, “the question of the end date for 
phasing out of all forms of export subsidies 
remains under negotiation.”  
 
The Cancun ministerial conference put 
agricultural export subsidies at the heart of the 
negotiations. However, the Cancun draft 
ministerial declaration of 13 September 2003 
only paraphrased the proposal contained in the 
pre-Cancun draft with no substantive 
modifications. Coupled with the sensitive 
issues raised in the cotton sector by four West 
and Central African countries,135 the stalemate 
                                                 
133  See the first draft of modalities, supra n. 2, paras. 
28-31. 
134  See the first draft of modalities, supra n. 2, paras. 
32-34. The exemptions under Article 9.4 relate to 
the provision of subsidies to reduce the costs of 
marketing and international transport and freight of 
exports of agricultural products, and internal 
transport and freight charges on export shipments 
on terms more favourable than for domestic 
shipments. 
135  Known generally as the Cotton Initiative, this is 
one of the rare success stories so far in the Doha 
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over export subsidies once again played its 
traditional role in facilitating the collapse of the 
ministerial conference. 
 
C. OTHER FORMS OF EXPORT 
SUPPORT: NEGOTIATIONS ON 
THE ROAD TO CANCUN  
 
Another important issue of export competition 
particularly in the eyes of the EC, but also 
several other countries, is the ‘discriminatory’ 
nature of the current agricultural export 
subsidies regime in the sense of not applying 
the same discipline to similar measures of 
export support, particularly export credit 
schemes, state-trading export enterprises and 
abuse of international food aid. After years of 
reluctance, the US now appears to have 
accepted the need for an internationally agreed 
discipline particularly in the case of export 
credits, credit guarantees and insurance 
mechanisms.136 Reflecting this encouraging 
progress, the Harbinson first modalities draft 
included a lengthy four-page-text providing the 
forms of export support to be covered by such 
an agreement, the terms and conditions under 
which they should be granted, and rules on 
transparency and special and differential 
treatment.137 The pre-Cancun draft framework 
reflected this emerging consensus by 
proposing to apply to export credits the same 
discipline that would apply to other agricultural 
export subsidies.138 This position was also 
repeated by the Cancun draft with no change.  
 
The differences between the EU and the US 
on the issue of food aid continued as wide as 
ever until quite late in the negotiation process. 
The EC has always believed that the US uses 
food aid as a means of circumventing its export 
subsidy commitments. On that basis, the EC 
proposed to revise the food aid provisions in 
the AoA so as to establish a genuine food aid 
                                                                       
agriculture negotiations. For an excellent 
background on the Cotton Initiative, see Kevin C. 
Kennedy, “The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, 
and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan 
Africa's Cotton Farmers?” 14 Kansas Journal of 
Law & Public Policy (Winter, 2005), pp. 307-356.  
136  Robert Zoellick described the US position on 
export credit schemes and food aid as a proposal 
“to guard against market disruption while 
maintaining the viability of these programs.” See 
supra n. 59. 
137  See Attachment 4 to the first modalities draft or 
attachment 5 to the revised version, supra n. 2. 
138  It is interesting to note that both the ‘US-EU joint 
proposal’ as well as the ‘pre-Cancun G20 
proposal’ were also at one on this point and the 
pre-Cancun draft was taken directly from them. 
system which responds to the real food aid 
needs of countries rather than the presence or 
absence of surplus production in the donor 
countries.139 The US, on the other hand, saw 
no problems with the rules and only wanted 
more transparency in their administration. The 
Harbinson first modalities draft went in line with 
the EU position and proposed rules that would 
require food aid to be provided in fully grant 
form, and to give preference to financial grants 
for purchase by the recipient country from 
whatever source it may wish rather than actual 
food exports unless it is necessitated by 
humanitarian emergency situations declared 
by appropriate United Nations food aid 
agencies.140 The pre-Cancun draft framework 
is open on this point, saying “disciplines shall 
be agreed in order to prevent commercial 
displacement through food aid operations.” 
Once again, the Cancun draft also left this part 
of the pre-Cancun draft unchanged.  
 
The use of State-Trading Enterprises (STEs) 
as export monopolies is also another issue 
subject to the Doha negotiations. Interestingly, 
this is one issue on which the US and the EC 
have been speaking with the same language 
from quite early on. The Canada Dairy dispute 
has given a substantial majority of WTO 
members enough reasons to stand united 
against the practice.141 Both the EC as well as 
the US, just like many others, want to write 
further disciplines into the Agreement on 
Agriculture so that price pooling, cross-
                                                 
139  For more on this subject, see Melaku Geboye 
Desta, ‘Food Security and International Trade 
Law: An Appraisal of the World Trade 
Organization Approach’ (2001) 35 Journal of 
World Trade, No. 3,  pp. 449-468. 
140  See Attachment 5 to the first modalities draft or 
attachment 6 to the revised version, supra n. 2. 
The revised first modalities draft has strengthened 
the proposal by introducing an important 
statement of principle as follows: “Members 
recognize that international food aid and the 
commitments undertaken in this regard under the 
Food Aid Convention play a critically important 
role in alleviating hunger and in contributing to 
world food security, particularly in responding to 
emergency food situations and to other food and 
nutrition needs of developing countries.  The 
following provisions are accordingly intended not 
to limit the role of bona fide international food aid, 
but to ensure that such aid is not used as a 
method of surplus disposal, nor as a means of 
achieving commercial advantages in world export 
markets.” See Attachment 6 to the revised first 
modalities draft, supra n. 2. 
141  See Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
reports of the panel (WTO docs. WT/DS103/R, 
WT/DS113/R) and the Appellate Body (WTO docs. 
WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/AB/R) adopted on 
27 October 1999. 
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subsidization, and similar practices carried out 
through state trading export enterprises would 
be expressly prohibited. Reflecting this growing 
consensus, the first Harbinson modalities draft 
proposed a fairly stringent set of rules on state 
trading export enterprises which sought to 
introduce not just market forces in their 
operation but even attempt to introduce 
competition by requiring governments to scrap 
their export monopoly powers.142 Both the pre-
Cancun as well as the Cancun draft 
frameworks also proposed to introduce the 
same stringent disciplines to export state 
trading enterprises as those applying to export 
credits and other forms of export subsidies.  
 
In sum, the Harbinson modalities draft was a 
fairly ambitious text on export subsidies. 
Although it may be difficult to think in terms of 
export subsidies continuing as legitimate 
instruments for over a decade to come, even 
such a result, if achieved, would have been an 
enormous accomplishment for the Doha 
negotiations. Moreover, apart from the ultimate 
phasing out of listed export subsidies, it 
appears that the long-promised discipline on 
export credits and other forms of export 
support is also probably within reach. 
Unfortunately, seeing how contentious this 
subject has been throughout the negotiations, 
it was already possible to predict further 
watering down of the modest proposals 
contained in the Harbinson draft. The Pre-
Cancun draft framework from General Council 
Chairman del Castillo as well as the Cancun 
draft itself are already much weaker than the 
Harbinson modalities draft. Export subsidies 
being the most destructive and the most 
reviled instruments of trade distortion in use 
today, any attempts at further weakening this 
part of the proposed rules could endanger the 
entire negotiations with total collapse. 
 
D. EXPORT COMPETITION: FROM 
CANCUN TO HONG KONG 
 
The July package saw an important 
breakthrough in the area of export competition. 
Members agreed “to establish detailed 
modalities ensuring the parallel elimination of 
all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on 
all export measures with equivalent effect by a 
credible end date.”143 The commitment to 
eliminate applied to export subsidies as listed 
in members’ schedules; export credits, export 
credit guarantees or insurance programmes 
                                                 
142  See Attachment 6 to the first modalities draft, or 
attachment 7 to the revised version, supra n. 2. 
143  See July package, supra n. 5, para. 17. 
with repayment periods beyond 180 days and 
those with a repayment period of under 180 
days which fail to conform with disciplines that 
are to be negotiated; trade-distorting practices 
of state trading export enterprises that are 
considered to be subsidized; and food aid that 
does not conform with various disciplines, 
which will also be negotiated.144 The July 
package however left the issue of end date 
unresolved, on which negotiations continued 
up until the last minutes in the preparation for 
Hong Kong.  
 
It was reported that a four-hour 'Green Room' 
meeting on the second day of the Hong Kong 
session “saw every country in attendance 
except the EU and Switzerland endorse a 2010 
end-date for agricultural export subsidies.”145 
The final declaration set this date for the end of 
2013, which is subject to confirmation upon the 
completion of the modalities agreement that 
set for 30 April 2006.146 Despite this condition 
and the long life that agricultural export 
subsidies have been allowed, this is perhaps 
what the Hong Kong ministerial will be 
remembered for over the long term. The date 
set for modalities is also the date that the Hong 
Kong declaration has set for the conclusion of 
new disciplines on export credits, export credit 
guarantees or insurance programmes (with a 
repayment period of less than 180 days), 
exporting state trading enterprises and food 
aid. Finally, the Hong Kong declaration also 
provides that developing country Members will 
continue to benefit from the provisions of 
Article 9.4 of the AoA only for five years after 






Agricultural domestic support refers to 
subsidies provided to agricultural producers 
regardless of whether their products are 
exported. Although domestic support as a 
concept is used only in the AoA, it means 
essentially the same as the more familiar 
concept of “domestic subsidies”.147 
Governments provide support to their 
agricultural producers in different ways – 
ranging from direct budgetary transfers to 
                                                 
144  See July package, supra n. 5, para. 18.  
145  See ICTSD, “Will Members Reveal Their Cards In 
Time?”, Bridges Hong Kong Daily Update, Issue 3, 
15 December 2005.  
146  See Hong Kong declaration, supra n. 6, para. 6.  
147  For more on this, see Desta (2002), supra n. 52, p. 
306.  
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highly disguised forms of market price support. 
Although the forms of support are diverse, they 
have certain features in common: they are 
intended to guarantee certain levels of income 
for agricultural producers; and they are 
implemented mainly by way of either setting 
minimum artificial prices on the market (which 
are necessarily higher than world market 
prices) or through direct budgetary transfers to 
agricultural producers.  
 
If the effect of such agricultural domestic 
support measures were limited to making 
recipient farmers better off, all would be well. 
The problem with several forms of domestic 
support is that, in trying to make the recipients 
better off, they distort the patterns of 
agricultural production and trade at the 
international level and leave non-supported 
farmers elsewhere worse off. Indeed, domestic 
support measures may nullify benefits accruing 
from trade liberalization. For instance, the 
effects of the reduction and binding of tariffs in 
multilateral trade negotiations may be 
circumvented by domestic support measures 
taken in favour of competing domestic 
products or producers. An international 
agreement to discipline the use of border 
measures without a concomitant agreement 
addressing important domestic policy issues 
will therefore not achieve its goals. Moreover, 
domestic support measures also affect 
international trade indirectly because they 
stimulate domestic production and often result 
in excess supply. Since world market prices 
are invariably lower than in the domestic 
market of the subsidizing countries, the excess 
can be exported only with the aid of subsidies 
or given in the form of food aid to other 
countries. Further, the artificially higher 
domestic market prices naturally attract 
imports; as a result, domestic support 
measures almost always need to be 
supplemented by some form of import 
restrictions so as to prevent importation of 
competing foreign products or re-importation of 
the subsidised exports themselves. Domestic 
support measures thus play a dual role in 
distorting agricultural markets, directly by 
giving artificial incentives for excess 
production, and indirectly by making the use of 
import barriers and export subsidies 
unavoidable. 
 
GATT never imposed any meaningful 
discipline on the use of domestic support, 
whether agricultural or otherwise,148 and the 
                                                 
148  See GATT Article XVI:1 which imposed only 
notification and consultation obligations. For more 
on this, see Desta (2002), supra n. 52, Chapter 9. 
only constraint in this respect came from the 
doctrine of reasonable expectations introduced 
by the Australia Ammonium Sulphate case 
which implied that countries would not be 
allowed to introduce subsidies on goods that 
are already subject to tariff commitments.149 
This quasi-judicial development was soon 
followed by the 1955 Understanding which 
provided that “a contracting party which has 
negotiated a concession under Article II may 
be assumed, for the purpose of Article XXIII, to 
have a reasonable expectation, failing 
evidence to the contrary, that the value of the 
concession will not be nullified or impaired by 
the contracting party which granted the 
concession by the subsequent introduction or 
increase of a domestic subsidy on the product 
concerned.”150 The Tokyo Round attempted to 
introduce a more effective discipline on the use 
of domestic subsidies; but the final version of 
the 1979 Subsidies Code merely required 
signatories to seek to avoid causing adverse 
effects to others’ interests through the use of 
domestic subsidies.151 It was the Uruguay 
Round SCM Agreement which introduced a 
more meaningful discipline on domestic 
subsidies for the first time. In its “traffic light 
approach”, the SCM Agreement put domestic 
subsidies largely in the “amber” category of 
actionable subsidies,152 which are subject to 
challenge on proof of injury; but, this 
Agreement left agricultural domestic support 
measures largely to the AoA.  
 
The AoA appreciated the causal role of 
domestic support measures behind market 
access restrictions and export subsidies, and 
its approach has been to promote decoupling 
of farm support from production decisions. The 
ubiquitous nature of domestic support 
measures particularly in the developed 
countries and the resolve of many to defend 
them meant that the long-term objective of the 
AoA “to establish a fair and market-oriented 
                                                 
149  Chile v. Australia: Subsidy on Ammonium 
Sulphate, Working Party Report (GATT/CP.4/39) 
adopted on 3 April 1950), BISD, Vol. II.  
150  GATT, BISD 3S/224. 
151  Under Article 8(3), “Signatories further agree that 
they shall seek to avoid causing, through the use 
of any subsidy (a) injury to the domestic industry 
of another signatory, (b) nullification or impairment 
of the benefits accruing directly or indirectly to 
another signatory under the General Agreement, 
or (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another 
signatory.”  
152  The only types of domestic subsidy put under the 
red box are the so-called import-substitution 
subsidies; three others have been put in the 
category of non-actionable subsidies. But, this 
latter category has been terminated on 1 January 
2000. 
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agricultural trading system” had to be 
compromised to enable those countries to 
continue to intervene in the market on the side 
of their farmers. The result is a complex mix of 
rules and exceptions whose trade-liberalization 
impact was minimal at least in the short-term.  
 
The AoA follows a positive list approach in the 
sense that trade-distorting domestic support 
measures are in principle prohibited unless 
specifically permitted. Measures so permitted 
may be put under three broad categories: 
some are available to all WTO members; some 
others are available exclusively to developing 
countries; and a third category are available 
almost exclusively to developed or high-
income developing countries. Two measures 
fall under the first category: all members are 
free to use the so-called “green box” measures 
under Annex 2 to the AoA; and all are free to 
provide de minimis levels of non-green support 
(5% for developed countries and 10% for 
developing countries of the total value of 
production of a basic agricultural product in the 
case of product-specific support or of total 
value of agricultural production in the case of 
non-product specific support). Secondly, in 
pursuit of the principle of special and 
differential treatment, three forms of support 
are available exclusively to developing country 
members: (i) investment subsidies that are 
generally available to agriculture; (ii) 
agricultural input subsidies that are generally 
available to low-income or resource-poor 
producers; and (iii) measures of producer 
support to encourage diversification from 
growing illicit narcotic crops. Finally come those 
measures available almost exclusively to 
developed and high-income developing 
countries: (i) direct payments provided under 
production-limiting programmes – called “blue 
box” measures – which are de jure available to 
every member but de facto limited to 
developed countries; and (ii) the residual 
category of all other forms of support that are 
not covered by any of the exemptions, 
generally called the “amber box” measures, 
which are de jure limited to a group of 35, 
largely OECD, countries counting EC (15) as 
one.153 These categories will be discussed 
further in this section. 
 
                                                 
153  For a list of these countries, see Committee on 
Agriculture, Special Session, Total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support, Note by the Secretariat, 
TN/AG/S/13, 27 January 2005.  
A. AMBER BOX MEASURES:  
 
1. Approach and Structure in the AoA  
 
These are domestic support measures that are 
deemed to have significant (or more than 
minimal) trade-distorting impact. Market price 
support measures are the classic example. 
These measures are prohibited in all but 35 
members.154 These 35 members are the ones 
that had reported to have used such trade- and 
production-distorting measures during the 
1986-88 base period155 and on which they 
have undertaken Aggregate Measurement of 
Support (AMS) reduction commitments in their 
schedules. The AMS is defined as “the annual 
level of support, expressed in monetary terms, 
provided for an agricultural product or non-
product specific support provided in favour of 
agricultural producers in general”.156 The 
calculation of the AMS takes into account both 
product-specific as well as sector-wide support 
and the final commitments are expressed in 
aggregate terms in the form of Total AMS.157 
The reduction commitments are then applied 
from the Total AMS determined by each 
country for the 1986-88 base period, called the 
Base Total AMS. It was from this benchmark 
that countries undertook 20 percent reduction 
commitments over a six-year implementation 
period in equal annual instalments (developing 
countries undertook only a 13.3 % reduction 
commitment over a ten year implementation 
period).158 A WTO member complied with its 
obligations in any given year of the 
implementation period if the actual amount of 
support provided during that year – called the 
Current Total AMS – did not exceed the 
corresponding annual or final bound 
commitment level specified in its Schedule.159 
It is worth noting that this commitment applies 
on a sector-wide rather than a product-specific 
level. The effect is that countries could legally 
                                                 
154  These are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, EC, Hungary, 
Iceland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Lithuania, 
Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland-
Liechtenstein, Thailand, Tunisia, United States, 
Venezuela.  
155  This does not of course apply to countries that 
joined the WTO after the Uruguay Round. 
156  Article 1(a) of the Agriculture Agreement. 
157  Article 1(h) of the Agriculture Agreement.  
158  See paragraph 8 of the Uruguay Round Modalities 
for the Establishment of Specific Binding 
Commitments Under the Reform Programme, 
GATT doc. MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, 20 December 
1993 (hereafter the Modalities Agreement).  
159  Article 6:3 of the Agriculture Agreement.  
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increase product-specific amber-box support to 
any level provided the aggregate limit was 
respected.   
 
As noted earlier, the 35 members that had 
undertaken domestic support reduction 
commitments are allowed to provide amber 
box support within the limits of their 
commitments, while those members that had 
not undertaken such commitments – 
exclusively the poorest developing countries – 
are prohibited from providing amber box 
measures at all. The only exceptions to this 
rule are the right to provide de minimis levels 
of support and the special and differential 
treatment options available to developing 
countries. Although presented in the AoA more 
as an exception rather than a rule, it is this 
prohibition on the use of amber box support 
that applies to over two-thirds of the WTO 
membership. It is no wonder therefore to see 
that the countries for which the use of amber 
box domestic support is already illegal are 
pursuing the goal of extending the ban to all 
members. But the argument for the elimination 
of amber box measures has also been made 
increasingly by countries that are entitled to 
use them today.160  
 
2. Major Issues of Amber Box Support 
in the Doha Negotiations: the Road 
to Cancun 
 
The major sticking points for the ongoing 
negotiations regarding amber box domestic 
support include the following: (1) should it be 
eliminated or just reduced? if the latter, by how 
much? and (2) should the aggregate 
commitments be replaced by product-specific 
commitments?  
To start with the latter issue, several countries 
argued that the aggregate nature of the 
commitments allowed countries to provide 
unlimited amounts of support to particularly 
sensitive sectors and that the only way 
domestic support commitments could help 
freer trade was if those commitments were 
product-specific. According to the Cairns 
Group, the current negotiations should “result 
in commitments on a disaggregated basis to 
ensure that trade and production-distorting 
support will be reduced for all agricultural 
                                                 
160  See for example the positions of the US and the 
Cairns Group. In fact, the EU, Japan and the US 
alone “account for 90% of total domestic support 
(i.e. AMS, blue box, green box, de minimis, and 
special and differential treatment) for the OECD 
area as a whole.” OECD (2001), supra n. 57, p. 
14.  
products.”161 A submission by the Association 
of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) used a 
similar language on disaggregation, but to be 
applied for developed countries only.162 On the 
opposite side stood, among others, Norway 
proposing that “the non-product specificity of 
the AMS support should be maintained in order 
to allow for flexibility to reallocate support 
among productions.”163  
On the more fundamental question concerning 
the fate of amber box measures in general, the 
US and the Cairns Group have been leading 
the camp that seeks to set a date by which all 
trade-distorting domestic support would be 
eliminated. The US’s stance on this subject 
has hardened over time. When the US 
presented its first comprehensive proposal on 
agriculture in June 2000, its primary objective 
was to introduce some form of “support 
harmonization” in which disparities in trade-
distorting support among countries would be 
reduced.164 In a later proposal, the US argued 
for a formula to limit all trade-distorting support 
to the de minimis level and for a date to be 
agreed for their eventual elimination.165 The 
Cairns Group has consistently argued for the 
elimination of trade-distorting support since 
2000.166  
 
The opposite camp has been led by, inter alia, 
the EU, Japan and Switzerland. According to 
the EU, the existing regime is “globally the right 
framework for addressing domestic support 
issues” and the only thing to talk about during 
the negotiations should be about the reduction 
of amber box support while maintaining the 
overall structure.167 In its proposal for the 
modalities, the EU maintained its approach 
and suggested a 55 % reduction on amber box 
                                                 
161  Cairns Group Negotiating Proposal: Domestic 
Support G/AG/NG/W/35, 22 September 2000. 
162  See Special and Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries in World Agricultural Trade: 
Submission by ASEAN, WTO doc. 
G/AG/NG/W/55, 10 November 2000. 
163  Proposal by Norway, G/AG/NG/W/101, 16 January 
2001. 
164  See Proposal for Comprehensive Long-Term 
Agricultural Trade Reform: Submission from the 
United States, G/AG/NG/W/15, 23 June 2000; see 
also Note on Domestic Support Reform: 
Submission from the United States, 
G/AG/NG/W/16, 23 June 2000. 
165  For later US positions, see 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/wto/proposal.htm. 
166  See Cairns Group proposal on domestic support, 
supra n. 161. 
167  See EC comprehensive proposal, supra n. 115, 
para.10. 
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support while maintaining the other boxes 
intact.168  
 
Amid all this, the first modalities proposal from 
Stuart Harbinson suggested a 60 % reduction 
in the final bound Total AMS in equal annual 
installments over a five year implementation 
period. Interestingly, Harbinson also made a 
half-hearted move towards disaggregation and 
suggested that “Article 6.3 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture shall be amended so as to 
ensure that the AMS for individual products 
shall not exceed the respective levels of such 
support provided on average of the years 
[1999-2001].” This would mean that while the 
reduction commitment remains an aggregate 
one, product-specific benefits would be capped 
at a level equal to the average benefit they had 
received during the 1999-2001 period. 
Needless to say, while this modest reform 
could easily be condemned as too little, it 
might be enough to attract strong opposition 
from influential interest groups representing 
such sensitive sectors as sugar, dairy and beef 
which are more likely to be affected more than 
others. Just as in the AoA, the Harbinson draft 
also proposed that developing countries 
undertake only two-thirds of the suggested 
reduction commitments to be implemented 
over ten years.  
 
The ‘US-EU joint proposal’ of 13 August 2003 
suggested reductions in a range – i.e. setting 
the minimum and maximum percentage points 
by which all amber box domestic support 
measures would be reduced. The joint text left 
the specific numbers for future negotiations. 
The framework proposed by the ‘G20 
Countries’ also accepted the overall approach 
of the ‘US-EU joint proposal’ introducing 
reductions in a range, but added several more 
stringent requirements. Firstly, the reduction 
commitments would be on a product-specific 
basis. Secondly, specific products benefiting 
from an above-average level of support over a 
certain base period would be subject to the 
maximum reduction rate within the range (thus 
leading to some degree of support 
harmonization). And, thirdly, a ‘down payment’ 
would be made in the form of a first reduction 
(by an amount that would be negotiated) 
across the board for all products within the first 
year of implementation period; and higher 
reductions, with a view to phasing out, of 
domestic support for products benefiting from 
such measures if those products are also 
                                                 
168  See EC proposal for the modalities agreement, 
supra n. 58, pp. 4-5. 
exported and account for a certain percentage 
of world exports of that product.  
 
The pre-Cancun framework for agricultural 
modalities prepared by General Council 
Chairman del Castillo was more in line with the 
‘US-EU joint proposal’ described earlier: 
adopting the approach of reductions in a range 
at an aggregate, sector-wide, level and with no 
reference to the support harmonization or 
down payment elements in the ‘pre-Cancun 
G20 proposal’. Thanks to the tenacity of the 
G20 countries during the ministerial 
conference, the Cancun draft framework 
proposed to cap product-specific support at 
their average levels for a representative period 
which would be agreed at a later stage.  
 
B. BLUE BOX MEASURES 
 
1. Approach and Structure in the AoA  
 
Under the AoA, direct payments made to 
farmers under production-limiting programmes, 
often known as the “blue” box measures, are 
excluded from the calculation of the Current 
Total AMS, and hence from the reduction 
requirements, on condition that certain 
important conditions are met. First of all, the 
payments need to be “direct” payments in the 
sense that they should not be transferred to 
farmers through market manipulation devices. 
Secondly, payment should be conditional upon 
some form of production-limiting measures 
being taken by the recipient, including on a 
fixed acreage and yields, or on 85 per cent or 
less of the base level production, or, in the 
case of livestock payments, on a fixed number 
of head.169 This option is de jure available to 
every WTO member; but a total of only nine 
Members, counting EC(15) as one, notified 
Blue Box support in at least one of the years 
1995 to 2003.170 These are Czech Republic, 
Estonia, EC (15), Iceland, Japan Norway, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and the US – all OECD 
countries. It is thus only natural that while 
almost all other countries have proposed to 
delete this box from the AoA and move its 
contents into the amber box and deal with 
them accordingly, those that have made use of 
the blue box – except the US which no longer 
maintains such measures – are its staunch 
defenders. Switzerland and Korea are 
examples of countries that have not used the 
blue box so far but that are defending it no less 
                                                 
169  See Article 6:5 of the Agriculture Agreement.  
170  See Committee on Agriculture Special Session, 
Blue Box Support: Note by the Secretariat, 
TN/AG/S/14, 28 January 2005.  
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passionately. Indeed, Switzerland joined the 
EU in declaring that progress in the 
negotiations would be possible only if the blue 
and green boxes were to be maintained.171 
The US and the Cairns Group led the camp 
which advocated scrapping this box altogether.  
 
2. Major Issues of Blue Box Support in 
the Doha Negotiations: the Road to 
Cancun 
 
The most important issue involving blue box in 
the Doha negotiations has thus been whether 
to retain or scrap it. The first Harbinson 
modalities proposal on this issue, perhaps 
more than on many others, was cluttered with 
parentheses, which indicates the high degree 
of contention involved. When looked at closely, 
however, both parenthetic options would 
effectively eliminate the blue box and either put 
its contents in the amber category, and hence 
subject to reduction commitments as such, or 
keep it as a separate category but subject it to 
discipline similar to that applying to amber 
box.172  
The ‘US-EU joint proposal’ suggested to cap 
the total value of blue box support at five 
percent of total value of national agricultural 
production in each member country. The 
proposal from the ‘G20 countries’, on the other 
hand, called for the elimination of blue box 
support altogether. The pre-Cancun draft 
framework for agricultural modalities as well as 
its Cancun revision proposed only a reduction 
approach based on the ‘US-EU joint proposal’.  
 
C. GREEN BOX MEASURES:  
 
1. Approach and Structure in the AoA  
 
Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture 
provides for a detailed but non-exhaustive list 
of practices for which governments may claim 
                                                 
171  For the Swiss position see its Statement to the 
Seventh Special Session of the Committee on 
Agriculture, 26-28 March 2001, G/AG/NG/W/155. 
See also WTO Secretariat, supra n. 57. 
172  The relevant proposal reads as follows: “Direct 
payments under production-limiting programmes 
provided in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 6.5 of the Agreement on Agriculture (Blue 
Box payments) [shall be capped at the average 
level notified for the implementation years [1999-
2001] and bound at that level in Members' 
Schedules.  These payments shall be reduced by 
[50] per cent.  The reductions shall be 
implemented in equal annual instalments over a 
period of [five] years.] [shall be included in a 
Member's calculation of the Current Total 
Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS)].” First 
modalities draft, supra n. 2, para. 43. 
exemptions from reduction/elimination 
requirements – so-called “green” box 
measures. Most of them are measures 
generally considered trade-neutral and the 
following is a brief summary of the measures 
falling under this box and the requirements 
they have to satisfy as provided in Annex 2 to 
the AoA. The basic requirement is that such 
measures must have no, or at most minimal, 
trade distortion effects or effects on production. 
This basic requirement is supplemented by a 
detailed and virtually exhaustive (although 
explicitly provided otherwise) list of measures 
along with general and policy-specific criteria 
they have to satisfy before being exempted 
from reduction commitments. The exemptions 
do not apply to market price support and all 
other forms of support involving transfers from 
consumers. Besides, while governments are 
allowed to take precautionary food security 
measures, provide general services (such as 
research, pest control, training, infrastructural 
development, etc.) to producers and domestic 
food aid to the needy, they are required to 
carry out these tasks as much as possible 
within the framework of market forces. 
Members may give an unlimited amount of 
direct income support to their farmers so long 
as the payments are made in a manner that is 
decoupled from production decisions and 
trade. Furthermore, Members are allowed to 
provide income insurance and disaster relief 
services on condition that farmers are not 
thereby made to profit from such occurrences. 
Finally, Members can also provide assistance 
for structural adjustment, and environmental 
and regional development purposes. In 
general, while decoupled payments may be 
made for whatever reason and to unlimited 
amounts, those payments that take the form of 
income insurance, disaster relief, structural 
adjustment assistance, environmental or 
regional development programmes have to 
comply with the requirement that they be not 
given in excess of the actual losses suffered or 
extra costs incurred to implement the 
government programme. According to WTO 
data, a total of 83 Members (counting the EC-
15 as one) had made notifications by 2004 
concerning their domestic support measures 
since the 1995 implementation year, and 68 of 
these had provided Green Box notifications.173  
 
                                                 
173  For comprehensive information about green box 
measures reported by WTO members, see 
Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Green 
Box Measures: Note by the Secretariat, 
TN/AG/S/10, 8 November 2004. 
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2. Major Issues of Green Box Support 
in the Doha Negotiations: the Road 
to Cancun 
 
Although economists seem to agree that no 
domestic support could be trade-neutral, 
‘green box’ measures have been relatively the 
least-contentious area of domestic support in 
the current negotiations. Proposals were, of 
course, submitted from different quarters: 
some wanted to abolish the box altogether and 
put its contents under the amber box category 
that is subject to reduction commitments174; 
some wanted to put a cap on the amount of 
money that could be spent on them; some 
others wanted to narrow the scope of 
measures falling under that box; still others 
wanted to enlarge the box so as to include 
additional measures.175 On balance, however, 
it is more likely that this box will survive the 
current negotiations without much modification. 
The only important issue here has been 
whether the criteria for ‘green box’ exemptions 
should be tightened.176  
 
The first Harbinson modalities draft suggested 
that the provisions of Annex 2 be maintained 
subject to minor modifications. Important 
among the suggested modifications were the 
following: (1) in response mainly to an EU 
insistence, the modalities draft suggested 
inclusion of animal welfare payments under 
paragraph 12 of Annex 2 along with payments 
under environmental programmes; and (2) in 
response to the concerns of developing 
countries, a long list of special and differential 
treatment provisions were proposed to exempt 
measures designed for, inter alia, maintaining 
domestic production capacity for staple crops, 
and payments to small-scale or family farms 
for reasons of rural viability and cultural 
heritage.177 Attachment 10 to the revised first 
modalities draft also introduced a catalogue of 
measures that would be included in a revised 
version of AoA Article 6.2 on special and 
differential treatment for developing countries 
which could significantly increase the number 
of domestic support measures that would be 
exempted from reduction commitments. The 
pre-Cancun draft framework for agricultural 
modalities as well as its Cancun revision left 
                                                 
174  See, e.g. a proposal by a group of 11 developing 
countries in WTO doc. G/AG/NG/W/13, 23 June 
2000.  
175  See WTO Secretariat, supra n. 57.  
176  For other proposals such as to take green box 
support into the amber box and subject it to 
reduction commitments, see, e.g. proposal by 
India, G/AG/NG/W/102, 15 January 2001. 
177  See revised first modalities draft, supra n. 2, 
attachment 8, para. 6. 
‘green box’ domestic support measures intact 
while noting that the criteria for a measure to 
be classified as such remained under 
negotiation.  
 
3. The Direction of Negotiations 
 on Domestic Support from 
 Cancun to Hong Kong 
 
An interesting feature of the July 2004 package 
is the support-harmonisation approach it 
introduced for trade-distorting domestic 
support. Harmonisation in domestic support is 
however different from harmonisation in 
agricultural market access. In the latter case, 
harmonisation refers to the process and 
objective of narrowing the gap between the 
tariff levels that apply to different products in 
different countries; it is in effect a means of 
minimising the level of tariff dispersion 
contained in the tariff schedules of a member 
country. In the context of domestic support, 
however, harmonisation refers to the process 
and objective of narrowing the gap between 
the levels of trade-distorting domestic support 
that could be provided by different countries; 
this is thus inter-country rather than inter-
product harmonisation. Indeed there is no 
room for inter-product harmonisation for 
domestic support because the commitments in 
this area, unlike in market access or even 
export subsidies, are sector-wide.  
 
The July package injected harmonisation as an 
objective in addition to the Doha objective to 
bring about “substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support”. Two levels of 
commitments are clearly provided in the July 
package in respect of trade-distorting domestic 
support, which is here understood to mean all 
non-green box measures of support (i.e. amber 
box measures, permitted de minimis levels, 
and the blue box) – overall and specific. The 
overall commitment would apply to a base 
level figure that would be made up of the Final 
Total AMS (for Amber Box), permitted de 
minimis levels and the higher of existing Blue 
Box payments during a recent representative 
period to be agreed.178 In order to achieve its 
object of harmonisation, the July package 
provided that the overall base level thus 
constituted would be reduced according to a 
tiered formula under which “Members having 
higher levels of trade-distorting domestic 
support will make greater overall reductions in 
order to achieve a harmonizing result.”179 The 
July package further agreed on a 20 percent 
                                                 
178  See July package, supra n. 5, paras. 7 & 8.  
179  See Id., para. 7. 
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reduction as a down payment at the beginning 
of the implementation period. This overall 
reduction commitment is supplemented by 
commitments specific to each trade-distorting 
domestic support – i.e. Amber Box, Blue Box 
and de minimis support. The tiered formula 
was once again agreed to apply to the 
reduction of the Amber Box measures so that 
members with higher AMS levels would make 
steeper cuts. However, the number of support 
bands and the rate that would apply to each 
were left for future negotiations. The July 
package also contained a commitment to cap 
product-specific AMS at their respective 
average levels according to a methodology to 
be agreed so as “to prevent circumvention of 
the objective of the Agreement through 
transfers of unchanged domestic support 
between different support categories”.180 
Reductions on de minimis levels were left for 
future negotiations; however there is already 
an agreement to exempt developing countries 
from any such reduction requirement provided 
they “allocate almost all de minimis support for 
subsistence and resource-poor farmers.” 181 
 
The Hong Kong declaration made some 
notable progress in this respect. It was agreed 
that there will be three bands for reductions in 
Final Bound Total AMS and in the overall cut in 
trade-distorting domestic support, with higher 
linear cuts in higher bands. Moreover, the gap 
in the amount of Final Bound Total AMS within 
the 35 members that undertook commitments 
in the area is so big that the Hong Kong 
declaration was able to be more specific about 
the allocation of countries to each of the three 
tiers. Accordingly, “the Member with the 
highest level of permitted support will be in the 
top band, the two Members with the second 
and third highest levels of support will be in the 
middle band and all other Members, including 
all developing country Members, will be in the 
bottom band.”182 On the basis of the latest 
WTO data, the one member that has the 
highest level of permitted support and that is 
going to be put in the top band is the EC(15) – 
which may do so as EC(25) following its latest 
expansion; the two members with the second 
and third highest levels of support that will be 
put in the middle band will be Japan and the 
US respectively; while the remaining 32 
members with domestic support commitments 
will be put in the third band.183 The rights of 
developing countries with no domestic support 
                                                 
180  See Id., para. 9. 
181  See Id., para. 11. 
182  See Hong Kong declaration, supra n. 6, para. 5. 
183  For the latest data on this, see TN/AG/S/13, supra 
n. 153. 
commitments to provide de minimis levels of 
support remain unaffected. The rate that will 
apply to each of the three bands is a matter left 
for the modalities agreement.  
 
The Blue Box also saw important 
developments in the July package. On top of 
the overall commitments that will apply to all 
trade-distorting domestic support, including the 
Blue Box, a specific agreement was reached to 
cap the Blue Box at no more than 5% of the 
value of a country’s agricultural production 
over a period to be negotiated. The Hong Kong 
declaration did not say much on the Blue Box.  
 
In relation to the green box measures, the July 
package simply commits members to review 
and clarify the criteria for measures to be put in 
this Box so as to ensure that they have no, or 
at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or 
effects on production.184 The Hong Kong 
declaration merely refers back to the July 
package to review the green box criteria and 
extend their coverage to programmes of 
developing country Members that cause not 




The foregoing discussion has shown that 
agriculture is once again dictating the pace of 
progress in trading negotiations at the WTO. 
Interestingly, the sticking points of today are 
very similar to the issues that immobilized the 
whole Uruguay Round process of negotiations 
over a decade ago. Nor is there any major 
change in the positions of the leading Uruguay 
Round players. Apart from the fact that 
developing countries are gaining in strength in 
making their voices heard with increased force 
and momentum, the traditional alignment of 
forces which we had during the Uruguay 
Round is still more or less intact – the old 
protectionists and conservatives are still trying 
their best to conserve their protectionist 
policies while the old liberalisers are still 
working hard for further and quicker 
liberalisation. The latter group have boosted 
their positions by injecting into their argument 
the enduring cause of developing countries 
and their special interest in this sector. The 
emergence of the high-profile issue of cotton 
subsidies later in the negotiations has further 
boosted this aspect of the argument.  
 
However, whatever governments may say in 
this respect, the issue about agriculture is one 
                                                 
184  See July package, supra n. 5, para. 16. 
185  See Hong Kong declaration, supra n. 6, para. 5. 
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of principle. If the multilateral trading system 
claims to be based on any principle, it is 
fairness, transparency and equal opportunities 
for all on the basis of the economic law of 
comparative advantage. The current rules of 
agricultural trade are only an embodiment of 
sheer hypocrisy in global economic relations. 
The solution proposed under paragraph 27 of 
the Cancun draft ministerial declaration on 
cotton was considered as one of the most 
blatant expressions of this hypocrisy. As one 
observer rightly put it, this is a situation in 
which “the US uses subsidies to deprive poor 
countries of comparative advantage. Then it 
tells them they have to find other kinds of 
business.”186 The negotiations since Cancun 
have changed many things, often in favour of 
developing countries. The commitment to 
eliminate developed countries’ export 
subsidies on cotton by 2006 and the 
agreement to extend duty- and quota-free 
market access for most goods originating in 
LDCs are worthy outcomes of the Hong Kong 
ministerial.  
 
Despite the slow progress, the agriculture 
negotiations still promise important 
developments in each of the three pillars. The 
elimination of all forms of agricultural export 
subsidies by 2013 is a historic achievement 
that should be protected from any last-minute 
diplomatic second-thoughts and compromises. 
Although the changes in this regard will require 
legislative and institutional modifications in only 
the 25 or so WTO members that have export 
subsidy commitments, the parallel disciplines 
that are expected to be completed as part of 
the modalities agreement by 30 April 2006 on 
such issues as export credits, food aid and 
state trading export enterprises may have 
more direct implications for other members as 
well. The picture will look broadly similar in the 
other two pillars as well. With respect to 
domestic support, the dual commitments to 
apply a tiered formula at the level of overall 
trade-distorting measures and specifically the 
Amber box would not create any obligations for 
countries with no trade-distorting domestic 
support measures in place – and most 
developing countries fall into this category. 
Indeed, to the extent their financial status 
permits, most of these countries may be able 
to introduce new support measures within their 
de minimis levels (for trade-distorting ones) 
and the green box. The agreement in the Hong 
Kong declaration to review the Green Box 
criteria so as “to ensure that programmes of 
                                                 
186  Quoted anonymously in Guy de Jonquiers, supra 
n. 43, p. 21. 
developing country Members that cause not 
more than minimal trade-distortion are 
effectively covered” appears to indicate that 
the review of Green Box criteria may even 
introduce further flexibilities for the benefit of 
developing countries.  
 
Likewise, the agreement to apply the tariff 
reduction commitments from bound rates 
rather than applied ones also has the effect of 
allowing most developing countries to retain 
their existing applied rates while reducing their 
bound rates to levels which should in many 
cases still remain far higher than what most of 
these countries may want to apply. In most 
developed countries, on the other hand, the 
gap between bound and applied tariffs is either 
small or non-existent, and the implications of 
the commitments will be more immediate in 
many cases. The introduction of the categories 
of sensitive and special products as well as the 
SSM will also require a revision of the national 
schedules of particularly the developing 
countries both to designate the beneficiary 
products as well as apply the permitted 
deviations from whatever tariff reduction 
formulae a are going to be agreed.  
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